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I.     INTRODUCTION 
A.     Is Money the Root of All Evil? 
 
The common adage “money is the root of all evil” is a mistransla-
tion of a phrase from St. Paul’s first Epistle to Timothy. “Radix omnium 
malorum est cupiditas”1 means “the love of money is the root of all 
evil.” Cupidity, or avarice, is one of the seven deadly sins: “not merely 
a wrongful act, but a disposition that corrupts the soul.”2 
Shifting the source of evil away from the subject of the sin (the 
lover of money) to its object (beloved money) seems to relieve the sin-
ner of his responsibility. To Immanuel Kant such attempts to shift 
blame is itself a form of “radical” evil—a banal evil that lies at the root 
(radix) of all human action.3 Nevertheless, when viewed through the 
prism of Jacques Lacan’s psychoanalytic theory, this mistranslation of 
St. Paul is unintentionally insightful. 
The real estate bubble and its subsequent pricking, and the market 
meltdown in 2008, looked crazy in the colloquial sense of the term.4 
From the perspective of psychoanalysis, Wall Street culture exhibits a 
specific pathology: obsessiveness. 
What does market madness have to do with the evil of money? 
An obsessive obsesses about obtaining an object because he sub-
jectively experiences it as the cause of his desire. Obsession is insatia-
ble because it is deluded. The obsessive does not really desire the ob-
 
 1 1 Timothy 6:10. Of course, St. Paul wrote in Greek. The Latin translation is from St. Je-
rome’s Vulgate. During the Reformation, this was sometimes changed to the anti-Catholic acro-
nym radix omnium malorum, avaritia. 
 2  Jeanne L. Schroeder, Envy and Outsider Trading, in MARTHA STEWART’S LEGAL TROU-
BLES 299, 304 (Joan MacLoed Heminway ed., 2007). St. Paul’s statement is the antithesis of the 
stereotypical trader’s creed, “greed . . . is good.” The memorable line is, of course, spoken by the 
villainous Gordon Gecko in the movie WALL STREET (Twentieth Century Fox 1987). 
 3 See infra text at notes 185–196. 
 4 Some have gone so far as to suggest that the most notorious villain of the financial world, 
Bernard Madoff, is literally insane, a psychopath. See, e.g., Julie Creswell & Landon Thomas, Jr., 
The Talented Mr. Madoff, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2009, at BU1. All good stories need a good 
villain. Madoff’s monstrous crime seems to make him a good candidate. Madoff was not, howev-
er, representative of the excesses of the 2000s. At most, he was symptomatic of structural flaws in 
the economy. The superheated financial and real estate markets were not caused by Ponzi 
schemes. But, large, long-term Ponzi schemes can probably only exist in a superheated market in 
which (i) there is a large pool of new investors willing to invest because they are convinced that 
the market has nowhere to go but up and (ii) a large pool of old investors who do not withdraw 
their investments because they are convinced that the market has nowhere to go but up. 
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ject, but something else he cannot admit to himself—the love of others.5 
The pursuit of the object is a fool’s errand that can spin out of control 
leading to breakdown and paralysis. On Wall Street, the annual bonus 
can function as the object cause of desire. As such, although money is 
not the root of all evil, it can function as the cause of some very destruc-
tive behavior. 
In this Article, I examine the ethics of the trader culture. I do not, 
however, attack capitalism per se. Nor do I consider the social, political, 
economic, or legal implications of the size of Wall Street compensation 
or income disparity in this country. Rather, I address the obsessional 
logic of the bonus. 
Although I discuss the obsessive aspect of the trader culture, I re-
sist armchair psychoanalysis of specific individuals. Such distant diag-
noses—such as journalistic speculation as to whether Bernie Madoff is 
psychotic or merely obsessive compulsive6—are doomed to triviality. 
What is useful about the Lacanian diagnostic categories is that they are 
not based on specific symptoms but on structures.7 Trader culture is 
itself structured in the obsessional way. Obsession is one neurotic ap-
proach one can take with respect to the universal human condition of 
alienation and desire.8 
Finally, although I discuss psychoanalysis in this Article, I do not 
work within the currently fashionable field of behavioral economics. I 
argue that the stereotypical trader acts as the economically rational man 
in pursuing his goals—it is just that his goals are not those predicted by 
neoclassic economic theory. 
 
B.     The Use Value of Money. 
1.     What is Money?  
 
Money is both familiar and unknown. Although people who desire 
money are conventionally condemned as being “materialist,” there may 
be nothing less material, indeed more “spiritual,” than money. Money is 
an article of faith.9 
 
 5 As Bruce Fink explains, “[h]uman desire, strictly speaking, has no object. . . . When you 
get what you want, you cannot want it anymore because you already have it.” BRUCE FINK, A 
CLINICAL INTRODUCTION TO LACANIAN PSYCHOANALYSIS 51 (1997). 
 6 See supra note 4. 
 7 See infra text at notes 41–51. 
 8 See infra text at notes 22–32. 
 9 Simon Critchley has recently made a similar point in his blog. Simon Critchley, Coin of 
Praise, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR (Aug. 30, 2009, 8:40 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.
com/2009/08/30/in-cash-we-trust/. 
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For the purposes of this Article, I start with the common under-
standing of money as a convention for measuring, amassing, and pre-
serving value or wealth.10 It enables people to commensurate their sub-
jective use value in their property into objective (i.e., intersubjective) 
exchange value so that buying and selling may occur.11 
Because of this, it is commonly thought that people seek money 
only derivatively—we do not care about money per se but about what 
money can buy.12 If we seek to accumulate and save money now, it is 
only so that we can consume something in the future—either directly by 
ourselves, or vicariously through our heirs. This seems definitional. If 
money is a mere measuring device, a temporary receptacle of exchange 
value to be used to acquire things having use value, then money should 
have no use value of its own.13 
 
2.     Bonus Culture 
 
Despite this, in the trader culture, one form of money has taken on 
a life of its own. Media coverage of the “bailout” of financial firms has 
 
 10 Russell W. Belk & Melanie Wallendorf, The Sacred Meanings of Money, 11 J. ECON. 
PSYCHOL. 35, 35 (1990) (“In the conventional economic view, money is a utilitarian commodity 
that acts as a medium of exchange, a unit of account, a store of value, and a standard of deferred 
payment.” (citation omitted)). Sociologists, by contrast to economists, recognize that societies in 
fact imbue money with a wide variety of other meanings. See id.; see also VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, 
THE SOCIAL MEANING OF MONEY (1997); Bruce G. Carruthers, The Meanings of Money: A 
Sociological Perspective, 11 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 51 (2010). 
 11 JEANNE LORRAINE SCHROEDER, THE TRIUMPH OF VENUS: THE EROTICS OF THE MARKET 
223–29 (2004) [hereinafter, SCHROEDER, VENUS]; Jeanne L. Schroeder, The Laconomics of 
Apples and Oranges: A Speculative Analysis of the Economic Concept of Commensurability, 15 
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 347, 380–86 (2003). 
 12 As Georg Simmel has stated, “[m]oney is the purest form of the tool . . . it is an institution 
through which the individual concentrates his activity and possessions in order to attain goals that 
he could not attain directly.” GEORG SIMMEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MONEY 210 (David Frisby 
ed., Tom Bottomore & David Frisby trans., 2d ed. 1990). In Guido Calabresi’s words, “‘desire for 
wealth’ is not a meaningful starting point, because while one may be able to give meaning to a 
desire for happiness, say, apart from other characteristics, one cannot give meaning to ‘wealth’ 
and hence to a desire for wealth in such an abstract state.” Guido Calabresi, About Law and 
Economics, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 553, 555 (1980). 
 13 Being nonsensical (in the strict sense of having no sense or value of its own) and empty, 
money anchors the market by serving as the placeholder for both the use and exchange value of 
other commodities. SCHROEDER, VENUS, supra note 11, at 246–50. One might be tempted to say 
that traditional coins made out of precious metals have use value. But, this begs the question as to 
why precious metals should be deemed precious—they can’t be eaten, burned for energy, or 
otherwise consumed. They can, of course, be fashioned into jewelry and other items of beauty. 
Nevertheless, precious metals only serve as money when they are commodified into fungible 
coins, ingots, and other repositories of value. Gresham’s law (bad money—debased coins—drives 
out good) reflects this tension between the use value of precious metals and the exchange value of 
coins. 
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alerted the public to the industry’s practice of paying so-called “bonus-
es”14 to its employees, particularly those who are literally traders. 
The practice of paying bonuses originated when investment banks 
were organized as general partnerships. Typically, partners pay them-
selves relatively modest salaries and divvy up profits—if any—
remaining at the end of the year. Because partners receive distributions 
only if the firm is profitable,15 they are incentivized to work hard per-
sonally. Because they are each personally liable if the firm suffers a 
loss, they are also incentivized to monitor each other to make sure that 
no one engages the partnership in overly risky transactions. 
This practice of paying year-end compensation in excess of stated 
salaries continued, however, after investment banks reorganized them-
selves as corporations and sold their equity to the public. This raises the 
classic conflicts caused by the separation of ownership and control fa-
miliar to all corporate lawyers. 
The culture is epitomized by the slogan “eat what you kill.” Origi-
nally, this expression encapsulated a modern hunter’s ethic of limita-
tion. That is, one should not kill any more animals then one could per-
sonally (with one’s family or friends) actually eat.16 This ethic reflects a 
disgust of obsessional killing for killing’s sake. “Eat what you kill,” 
however, has been perverted by the trader’s culture as an antiethic of 
freedom from limitation. That is, one is metaphorically entitled to eat 
whatever one kills in the sense that the person who brings in business is 
entitled to keep all of the financial benefits and not share gains or losses 
with the firm (and its shareholders) as a whole.17 
Prior to the market meltdown there was a substantial legal litera-
ture concerning management remuneration in operating companies, but 
virtually none concerning the financial industry. Since then, a wine-dark 
sea of ink has been spilled about whether the structure of Wall Street’s 
bonuses encouraged overly risky practices that contributed to the bubble 
 
 14 I put scare quotes around my first use of the word “bonus” because the colloquial use of the 
term bears the connotation of a discretionary payment that constitutes a relatively small portion of 
an employee’s compensation. By contrast, Wall Street “bonuses” typically form a large majority 
of a trader’s compensation, and are frequently a contractually obligated form of “incentive” 
compensation. Steven Brill, What’s a Bailed-Out Banker Worth, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2010, § MM 
(Magazine), at 32. 
 15 This was my experience as a “partner” of a law firm (actually, as we were organized as a 
professional corporation, I was a shareholder and director, but the same principle applies). See 
Peter Weinberg, Wall Street Needs More Skin in the Game: Partnerships Were One Way of 
Aligning the Interests of Money Managers and Investors, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 2009, at A21. Of 
course, there are exceptions, such as when a partnership awards a bonus to particularly productive 
contributor in a year when the firm (and other partners) do not make profits. 
 16 See, e.g., T. Edward Nickens, The Manifesto: Eat What You Kill, FIELD & STREAM 
WHITETAIL 365 (Dec. 1, 2009), http://www.fieldandstream.com/blogs/hunting/2009/12/
manifesto-eat-what-you-kill. 
 17 Paul McFedries, eat what you kill, WORDSPY (June 3, 2003), http://www.wordspy.com/
words/eatwhatyoukill.asp. 
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and bust and whether a restructuring would better align the interests of 
traders, on the one hand, with those of stockholders and the public, on 
the other. I do not, however, wade into this debate. 
What interests me is why financial firms seem so resistant to sub-
stantial internal reform and remain so tin-eared about public reaction to 
their practices. That is, although it may be understandable why any in-
dividual trader would resist a change in his personal bonus, it is less 
clear why management doesn’t jump at the chance to make meaningful 
change in firms’ compensation structure. 
Wall Street firms argue that the bonus system is necessary in order 
to recruit and retain top talent.18 To an outsider, this explanation sounds 
disingenuous at best. Whether or not this is true of a small cadre of top 
individuals, given the numbers of layoffs in 2008 and 2009, one would 
presume that there was a buyers’ market for talent.19 A related populist 
opinion, voiced by Barney Frank, the chairman of the House Financial 
Services Committee: “Let ‘em quit. Who needs them? How can we re-
ward the same people who screwed up in the first place?”20 
I suggest that one reason for the persistence of the bonus system is 
that it appeals to the obsessive personality. In the trader culture, mon-
ey—in the specific form of bonuses—has attained a use value in addi-
tion to the exchange value money is traditionally supposed to have. 
What is important is less the total amount of compensation paid than the 
fact that it is largely paid in the form of the bonus. The bonus has be-
come what Lacan calls an objet petit a—an object that inflames the sub-
ject’s desire.21 This suggests that the compensation system incentivizes 
 
 18 James Surowiecki, Taxing the Banks, NEW YORKER BALANCE SHEET (Jan. 13, 2010), 
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/jamessurowiecki/2010/01/taxing-the-banks.html; see 
also, e.g., Big Think Interview with Bill George, BIGTHINK (Dec. 23, 2009), http://bigthink.com/
ideas/17908 (“If you don’t pay them for their performance, you’ll lose them. It’s much like pro-
fessional athletes and movie stars.” (quoting Bill George, a member of Goldman Sachs’s board of 
directors)). Of course, even if this analogy is valid, it begs the question as to whether the compen-
sation paid to athletes, either individually or as a profession, reflects actual performance. Perhaps 
the most well-known sustained critique of the link between pay and performance is MICHAEL M. 
LEWIS, MONEYBALL: THE ART OF WINNING AN UNFAIR GAME (2003). One liberal commentator 
has suggested that professional athletes are overcompensated because sports are highly subsidized 
by governments, and makes the obvious analogy to the pay at “bailed-out” firms. Daniel Archer, 
What Do Professional Athletes Have in Common with Bankers?, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 21, 
2010, 11:28 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-adler/what-do-professional-athl_b_
400148.html. Perhaps the better analogy is to baseball players who take steroids. Mike Vogel, 
Justice Department: Yankee Si, Wall Street No, N.Y. GRITTY (July 20, 2011), http://newyork
gritty.net/?p=1508. 
 19 As one commentator has put it, “[i]t’s unlikely that many good people will leave, but if 
they do move to smaller institutions that are not Too Big To Fail, that’s good for the rest of us.” 
Simon Johnson, It’s Time for a Supertax on Big Bank Bonuses, NEW REPUBLIC (Jan. 11, 2010, 
12:23 PM), http://www.tnr.com/blog/simon-johnson/its-time-supertax-big-bank-bonuses. 
 20 Quoted in Brill, supra note 14, at 34. 
 21 See infra text at notes 28–32. 
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not the productive but the most solipsistic and most destructive aspect 
of capitalism. 
 
3.     Obsession and Objects 
 
A Wall Street Journal column commented on the demise of the in-
famous Trader Monthly magazine in early 2009.22 This publication, 
having the slogan “See it. Make it. Spend it,” compiled lists of the 
“best” traders in the country, based largely on the size of bonus com-
pensation. It also reviewed luxury goods to acquire with bonuses, such 
as a $300,000 stereo turntable. The comment pointed out, however, that 
these reviewers did not emphasize the pleasure these luxuries would 
give to their buyers—indeed, even before the days of compact discs, 
how could a turntable designed for home use conceivably have a use 
value of $300,000? In this case, the magazine recommended the turnta-
ble because owning it would be like giving “a huge middle finger to 
everyone who enters your home.” In other words, to the magazine’s 
readership the relationship between wealth and consumption is the re-
verse of what is usually thought. The trader does not seek wealth in 
order to obtain luxury items like ridiculously priced turntables. 
The commentator implicitly assumed that traders seek to acquire 
objects to impress others. At least since Thorstein Veblen coined the 
term,23 sociologists have posited that much “conspicuous consumption” 
is done less for personal pleasure than to enhance prestige. Similarly, in 
their noted article De Gustibus Non Disputandam, Gary Becker and 
George Stigler argue that the reason why there is no arguing about 
tastes is not because tastes are subjective and, therefore, incommensura-
ble.24 Rather, tastes are objective. We can’t argue about tastes because 
we all share the same tastes very broadly defined—including the desire 
to be respected by others. One obtains specific objects only as means to 
achieve these more general goals. This analysis (no doubt unintentional-
ly) reflects Hegel’s theory as to the “logic” of property and contract: 
legal relations are merely means of achieving the end of self-
actualization through intersubjective recognition.25 Lacan would argue 
that this desire is hysterical (rather than obsessive) in nature, which is 
 
 22 Thomas Frank, Wall Street Mocked American Values, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 2009, at A15. 
 23 THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS (Penguin Classics ed. 1994) 
(1899). 
 24 George J. Stigler & Gary S. Becker, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, 67 AM. ECON. 
REV. 76, 77 (1977); see also GARY S. BECKER, ACCOUNTING FOR TASTES 5, 87 (1996). 
 25 I explicate Hegel’s theory elsewhere. My most complete accounts appear in SCHROEDER 
VENUS, supra note 11, at 42–64, 74–76; and JEANNE LORRAINE SCHROEDER, THE VESTAL AND 
THE FASCES: HEGEL, LACAN, PROPERTY, AND THE FEMININE 27–52, 262–85 (1998) [hereinafter 
SCHROEDER, VESTAL]. 
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why he called Hegel the “most sublime hysteric.”26 The hysteric’s de-
sire is the desire of the other.27 
The obsessive’s relationship with his objet petit a—the object 
cause of his desire—is more complex. The obsessive seeks his object 
not to impress or establish dominance over others, but to gain control 
over himself.28 If a hysteric fixates on other subjects, an obsessive ob-
sesses over objects in a vain attempt to convince himself that he does 
not need other subjects. Paradoxically, by doing so he unwittingly re-
veals that his real concern is the others he pretends to ignore. In fact, he 
has no confidence in his own self-assessment of his worth. He can only 
judge himself through the eyes of others. He wants to think of himself 
as independent of others, but the very existence of others threatens his 
pretense to independence. He therefore obsesses about obliterating oth-
ers. The object is a means to this end. 
The obsessive doesn’t want to consume objects. He wants to amass 
and possess them. Consequently, there is no reason why the object of 
his obsession need be a physical one, let alone a conventionally desira-
ble one. Bruce Fink, a Lacanian psychoanalyst on whom I heavily rely 
in this Article, goes so far as to suggest that, at least in late Lacan, his 
use of the term “object” might be a misnomer—a leftover from an earli-
er moment in “the evolution of his own thought over time.”29 I argue, by 
contrast, that Lacan is working within the tradition of Hegelian philoso-
phy of property that identifies “objects” as anything other than the sub-
ject himself. Indeed, Hegel would agree with Lacan that the archetypi-
cal object is not, as is colloquially thought, tangible. Rather it is an 
intangible object.30 
Similarly, Lacan argues that most powerful objets petit a are com-
plete abstractions, such as the voice or the gaze—anything that can 
 
 26 JACQUES LACAN, THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN, BOOK VII: THE ETHICS OF PSYCHO-
ANALYSIS, 1959–1960, at 38 (Jacques-Alain Miller ed., Dennis Porter trans., W.W. Norton & Co. 
1986) [hereinafter LACAN, SEMINAR VII]. 
 27 As Lacan elaborates: 
To put it in a nutshell, nowhere does it appear more clearly that man’s desire finds its 
meaning in the desire of the other, not so much because the other holds the key to the 
object desired, as because the first object of desire is to be recognized by the other. 
JACQUES LACAN, SPEECH AND LANGUAGE IN PSYCHOANALYSIS 31 (Anthony Wilden trans., 
1981). Žižek points out that Lacan is speaking about the hysterical subject specifically. SLAVOJ 
ŽIŽEK, THE INDIVISIBLE REMAINDER: AN ESSAY ON SCHELLING AND RELATED MATTERS 167 
(1996) [hereinafter ŽIŽEK, INVISIBLE REMAINDER]. 
 28 I discuss this dynamic infra text at notes 163–173. As the following discussion shall make 
clear, my use of the masculine pronoun is intentional. 
 29 FINK, supra note 5, at 52. 
 30 Jeanne L. Schroeder, Unnatural Rights: Hegel and Intellectual Property, 60 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 453, 464–66 (2006); see also SCHROEDER, VESTAL, supra note 25, at 35–37, 39, 111–12, 
118–19. Of course, this means that “possession” should not be thought of as the physical holding 
of a tangible thing. Rather, it is the right to exclude others from enjoying one’s object. 
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serve to incite the subject’s desire.31 It is precisely the abstract, vacuous 
nature of these “objects” that better able the obsessive to project his 
fantasies on them—they are blank screens. Money—the one object in 
the marketplace without content—is a perfect candidate for this role.32 
 
4.     Wealth Maximization 
 
Economic rationality—at least as that term tends to be used in legal 
literature—is instrumental or ends-means reasoning. It is the ability to 
choose means calculated to achieve one’s ends.33 Psychoanalysis, de-
spite its many differences with neoclassical economics, would agree the 
obsessional subject acts as though he were economically rational. Psy-
choanalysis differs from economics, however, in its view of the end the 
subject pursues. 
Economists generally assume that subjects seek to maximize “utili-
ty,”34 although economists claim to be neutral as to what object will 
bring utility to any individual. However, when the object is obtained, 
the subject consumes it in the blazing flame of pleasure.35 Rather than 
being a utility maximizer, however, the obsessive trader follows the 
alternative goal of economically rational activity once proposed by 
Richard Posner.36 Posner argued that judges should interpret laws in 
such a way calculated to maximize the aggregate wealth of society, not 
its utility.37 
 
 31 FINK, supra note 5, at 52. 
 32 See supra note 3. 
 33 Behavioral economists in the legal academy do not disagree with this definition. They just 
believe that, as an empirical matter, economic actors deviate from this ideal in certain predictable 
ways. Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 
1471, 1476–78 (1998). 
 34 Mark Blaug describes the neoclassic notion of rationality as follows: 
For the economist . . . rationality means choosing in accordance with a preference or-
dering that is complete and transitive, subject to perfect and costlessly acquired infor-
mation; where there is uncertainty about future outcomes, rationality means maximiz-
ing expected utility, that is, the utility of an outcome multiplied by the probability of its 
occurrence. 
MARK BLAUG, THE METHODOLOGY OF ECONOMICS, OR, HOW ECONOMISTS EXPLAIN THINGS 
229 (2d ed. 1992). Although economists differ as to precisely what “utility” is, for our limited 
purposes we can think of it as something like “happiness” or “satisfaction.” This is, of course, 
another version of the theory that economically rational persons acquire wealth for the sake of 
eventually buying things that they can consume. 
 35 A noted exception is Gary Becker who argues that economic actors should be viewed as 
producers rather than as mere consumers of utility. BECKER, supra note 24, at 128–29. 
 36 Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103, 
103–05 (1979). 
 37 Posnerian wealth maximization has both positive and normative aspects. The latter posits 
that “judges should interpret . . . statutes to make them conform to the dictates of wealth maximi-
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Posner’s critics countered that whether or not wealth maximization 
could cure the widely recognized problems with utilitarianism, it is not 
obvious that subjects actually do, let alone should, maximize wealth.38 
Lacan’s theory, however, suggests that many people are, in fact, wealth 
maximizers. Nevertheless, the theory would also agree with Posner’s 
critics, questioning why society would want to encourage this neurotic 
behavior. Mild obsessive behavior can be very productive. But, as the 
market meltdown shows, extreme obsession can be destructive of self 
and others. Ovid gave us in Midas the great cautionary tale of where the 
obsession with wealth, as opposed to happiness, leads.39 I am reminded 
of Ronald Coase’s great observation: “There is no reason to suppose 
that most human beings are engaged in maximizing anything unless it 
be unhappiness, and even this with incomplete success.”40 
 
II.     SUBJECTIVITY 
A.     Lacan 
 
The psychoanalytic theory I follow here is not the more familiar 
Freudian one.41 Jacques Lacan referred to his project as a “return to 
Freud”42 in the sense of a rereading with a ruthlessly critical eye. Alt-
hough he confusingly retained much of Freud’s terminology, Lacan 
eventually rejected Freud’s depressing anatomical determinism in favor 
of a more abstract, retroactive—indeed philosophical—account of the 
development of human subjectivity that located him as much in the 
company of Kant and Hegel as with Freud. 
One of the advantages of Lacanian psychoanalysis for jurispruden-
tial theory is its simple diagnostic system. The DSM-IV, the diagnostic 
handbook promulgated by the American Psychiatric Association, lists 
 
zation.” RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 173 (1995). Whether, and to what extent, 
Posner still holds this position is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 38 See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 509 (1980); Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191 (1980); Lewis 
A. Kornhauser, A Guide to the Perplexed Claims of Efficiency in the Law, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
591 (1980); Anthony T. Kronman, Wealth Maximization as a Normative Principle, 9 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 227 (1980). 
 39 OVID, THE METAMORPHOSES (Brookes More trans., 1922), available at http://www.theoi.
com/Text/OvidMetamorphoses1.html. I discuss the relationship between the Midas myth and 
wealth maximization in SCHROEDER, VENUS, supra note 11, at 205–08. 
 40 R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 4 (1988). 
 41 Most specifically, I reject as unhelpful the crude Freudian theory that acquisitiveness 
springs from infantile anal retentiveness. See, e.g., SIGMUND FREUD, From the History of an 
Infantile Neurosis, in 17 THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 7 (James 
Strachey ed. & trans., 1955). 
 42 See, e.g., PHILIPPE JULIEN, JACQUES LACAN’S RETURN TO FREUD: THE REAL, THE SYM-
BOLIC, AND THE IMAGINARY (Devra Beck Simiu trans., 1994). 
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297 different syndromes.43 The reason why the DSM-IV has so many 
diagnostic categories is that it identifies syndromes by individual symp-
toms, which may be potentially as numerous as there are individual 
people. By contrast, Lacan deemphasizes symptoms as diagnostic 
tools44 and categorizes syndromes structurally—that is, by the logically 
possible ways an analytic subject can approach law and desire.45 Conse-
quently, Lacan identifies only three broad categories—psychosis, per-
version, and neurosis—and a limited number of subcategories.46 Neuro-
sis is divided into the “masculine” neurosis of obsession and the 
“feminine” neurosis of hysteria.47 
Consequently, when I say that trader culture is obsessive, I am not 
arguing that individual traders exhibit the symptom of obsessive-
compulsive disorder (although no doubt some do). Rather, I am saying 
they adopt a specific “position” with respect to desire. 
By deemphasizing symptoms as diagnostic tools,48 Lacanian prac-
tice looks more forward than backward. To perhaps oversimplify, tradi-
tional psychoanalysis sees symptoms as resulting from a trauma in the 
analysand’s early life. A trauma is an event that is literally unspeakable 
in the sense that the analysand repressed it and is unable to integrate it 
into the symbolic order of language, which is why it manifests itself in 
symptoms. The talking cure is supposed to occur when the analysand 
articulates the trauma, at which point the symptom should dissolve, by 
definition. The problem with this is, as analysts soon found, that as an 
empirical matter, analysands lovingly cling to their beloved symptoms 
even after articulation.49 
In Lacanian psychoanalysis, “cause” is less a historical event, than 
a retroactive reconstruction—what is called an “abduction” in logic. A 
 
 43 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, THE DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS (rev. 4th ed. 2000). 
 44 For example, Fink points out that many non-Lacanian psychoanalysts see hallucinations as 
conclusive evidence of psychosis. Lacanians reject this because even “normal” persons at times 
see and hear things that don’t objectively exist (as when a bereaved spouse “sees,” out of the 
corner of his eye, the dead sitting in her usual chair). FINK, supra note 5, at 82–83. Consequently, 
Lacan abandoned Freud’s attempt to distinguish between obsessive and hysterical neurotics by 
their symptoms. Id. at 114–17. 
 45 Id. at 75–78. 
 46 Id. at 115–18. 
 47 It is unclear whether phobia should be considered a third subcategory of neurosis. Id. at 
163. Phobia is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 48 That is not to imply that the study and treatment of symptoms is not of the utmost im-
portance in Lacanian psychoanalysis. It is rather that the commonplace association of certain 
symptoms with certain syndromes should not form “a hard and fast rule and does not afford a 
reliable distinction between obsession and hysteria.” FINK, supra note 5, at 115. Fink continues: 
“[a] predominance of [certain] symptoms in a patient’s clinical picture may suggest a diagnosis of 
hysteria, but one still needs to look further” because such symptoms “can be found in a number of 
different clinical categories.” Id. 
 49 SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK, THE SUBLIME OBJECT OF IDEOLOGY 74 (1989) [hereinafter ŽIŽEK, SUB-
LIME OBJECT]. 
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symptom does not simply exist because a terrible thing happened in the 
analysand’s life. Rather, we speculate that there must have been a trau-
ma because of the existence of the symptom—symptoms are “the actu-
ality of trauma.”50 As such, Lacanian analysis is not forensics. It does 
not so much seek to discover the actual historical causes of a trauma: 
“Lacan does not share Freud’s concern with first causes, devoting his 
attention to logical processes instead.”51 Instead, it helps the analysand 
restructure him- or herself so that he or she is no longer so dependent on 
his or her symptom. To put this another way, to Freud, meaning is 
something one finds in the past and articulates. To Lacan, meaning is 
something one creates through articulation. Traditional analysts seek to 
discover what is lost; Lacanians seek to interpret that which is here. 
 
B.     The Liberal Subject 
 
Lacan’s theory of subjectivity, like Freud’s, is based on a theory of 
childhood development. Lacanian psychoanalysis does not start with the 
founding assumption of all schools of classical liberalism that underlies 
most Anglo-American jurisprudence and neoclassical economic theory: 
that is, some vision of the subject as the autonomous individual in a 
hypothetical state of nature. Psychoanalysis, by contrast, echoing Conti-
nental speculative philosophy, posits that individuality is not natural, 
but artificial—a hard-earned achievement that is literally manmade. In 
psychoanalytic terminology, the liberal individual is the “ego,”52 a sub-
ject’s self-image that is a “fantasy.”53 Like all fantasies, it is created 
through the psychic order called the “imaginary.” The terms of art “fan-
tasy” and “imaginary” denote neither that the ego is nonexistent nor that 
the subject is delusional.54 Rather, they imply that one’s self-image is 
 
 50 JEANNE LORRAINE SCHROEDER, THE FOUR LACANIAN DISCOURSES, OR, TURNING LAW 
INSIDE-OUT 109 (2008) [hereinafter SCHROEDER, FOUR DISCOURSES]. In Fink’s words, “our only 
‘proof’ of the existence of the repressed is its return, its manifestations in the form of disruptions 
or interruptions. The existence of a symptom . . . is the only proof psychoanalysis has or needs of 
repression.” FINK, supra note 5, at 114. 
 51 FINK, supra note 5, at 162. As Fink admits, the  
“defining characteristics” [of the different neuroses] are not etiological in nature; I 
have not sought to answer here the question of why someone becomes hysteric or ob-
sessive (except parenthetically in my commentaries on the preceding cases), confining 
my attention to the what of hysteria and obsession. I have sought to use Lacan’s most 
far-reaching distinctions to indicate what hysteria and obsession are and how they dif-
fer from each other. 
Id. at 161. 
 52 Id. at 24. 
 53 For a discussion of fantasy, see SCHROEDER, FOUR DISCOURSES, supra note 50, at 11, 133. 
 54 For example, in Fink’s words, “when Lacan said that ‘meaning is imaginary’ . . . [he] did 
not imply that meaning does not exist, or that it is simply something that we dream up in our 
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subjective (personal, idiosyncratic) as opposed to intersubjective (sym-
bolic). 
I see the distinction between liberalism and speculative theory as 
follows. Both are concerned with the actualization of individual free-
dom. Because liberalism sees the individual as the norm, it struggles to 
explain the creation of society. Speculative philosophy, by contrast, sees 
the social as the norm, and struggles to explain the creation of the indi-
vidual.55 Individuation is, therefore, not something one finds, but cre-
ates. 
As an empirical matter, human infants are born helpless. Physical 
survival and maturity requires a lengthy tutelage. An infant can achieve 
subjectivity only through interrelationships with others—i.e., it enters 
what Lacan calls the “symbolic” order of law and language.56 
The paradoxical fact of the human subject is that although he is 
born into, and can only exist within, a social order, nevertheless he can 
only participate in the social order insofar as he is an individual—just as 
liberalism intuits. This is because participation in a human society re-
quires that one be recognized as a unique and identifiable member of 
that society by other members. Recognition, therefore, requires individ-
uation and separation. A human symbolic order is not like a beehive or 
an anthill where each individual is merely a part of the whole, similar to 
the way that cells are component parts of a single body. Rather, the sub-
ject is always to some extent separated, and therefore alienated, from 
the society in which he is located. 
This leads to a second paradox, which is essential to the analysis of 
obsession. Although when viewed from the position of the symbolic 
order of language and law, the subject is an individual, when viewed 
from the position of the subject, he is what Simon Critchley has called a 
“dividual.”57 That is, subjectivity is divided—characterized by a funda-
mental, internal split. 
 
imagination. He implied that it is tied up with our self-image.” FINK, supra note 5, at 24. 
 55 Most importantly, although speculative philosophy is critical of liberalism, it does not so 
much reject liberalism as seek to supplement and go beyond it. 
 56 Lacan posits that the subject is split between three orders—the symbolic, the imaginary, 
and the real. See JACQUES LACAN, THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN, BOOK I: FREUD’S PAPERS 
ON TECHNIQUE, 1953–1954, at 80 (Jacques-Alain Miller ed., John Forrester trans., Cambridge 
University Press 1988); JACQUES LACAN, Introduction to the Names-of-the-Father Seminar, in 
TELEVISION: A CHALLENGE TO THE PSYCHOANALYTIC ESTABLISHMENT 81, 88–89 (Denis 
Hullier et al. trans., 1990). In Fink’s formulation: 
 What are symbolic relations? One simple way of viewing them is as one’s relation to 
the Law, to the law laid down by one’s parents, one’s teachers, one’s religion, one’s 
country. Symbolic relations can also be thought of as the way people deal with ideals 
that have been inculcated in them by their parents, schools, media, language, and socie-
ty at large, embodied in grades, diplomas, status symbols, and so on. 
FINK, supra note 5, at 33. 
 57 SIMON CRITCHLEY, INFINITELY DEMANDING: ETHICS OF COMMITMENT, POLITICS OF 
Schroeder.33-6.doc (Do Not Delete) 8/27/12  7:09 PM 
2320 CARDOZO LAW  REVIEW  [Vol. 33:6 
The hypothesis that the subject is artificial does not mean that he is 
unnatural or that nurture dominates over nature. Like all other human 
creations, the subject is created from natural components and is subject 
to natural limitations. Indeed, I read Lacan as completely rejecting any 
and all concepts of transcendence in favor of a completely materialist 
conception of the world. For something to be possible, it must be actu-
al.58 To put this another way, humans could not become individuated 
subjects unless they had the preexisting biological capacity for individ-
uation. Nevertheless, the mere biological capacity for individuation, 
does not mean that a specific human being will successfully achieve 
individuation, let alone self-actualization. Some people are enslaved by 
others. Some enslave themselves: they obsess. 
 
C.     The Split Subject 
 
We are all scarred in the battle for individuation, although some 
are left more badly injured than others. Most normal subjects emerge 
from this process as neurotics—either obsessives or hysterics. Those 
who don’t make it remain as psychotics or perverts. 
Lacan spoke of the normal (i.e., neurotic) adult as the split or 
barred subject—i.e., alienated, empty.59 One reason why the subject is 
split and self-alienated is that what he experiences as most himself—his 
individual personality—comes from outside of him- or herself—from 
social relations. The subject is split between his or her own idiosyncrat-
ic desires and aspirations and the demands of others.60 Lacan coined the 
neoplasm “extimacy” to describe this uncanny relationship of the divid-
ual subject to his own self.61 
There are a few points to emphasize now that I address later. First, 
because the subject feels alienated and incomplete, he or she is filled 
with desire. Indeed, subjectivity can be thought of as nothing but the 
 
RESISTANCE 11 (2007). This is why in Lacan’s various diagrams and formulae, the subject is 
represented by the “matheme” “∃” with a bar bifurcating the capital “S” standing for subject. 
BRUCE FINK, THE LACANIAN SUBJECT: BETWEEN LANGUAGE AND JOUISSANCE 173 (1995) 
[hereinafter FINK, SUBJECT]. 
 58 This is one of the meanings of Hegel’s oft-misinterpreted statement that “what is rational is 
actual, and what is actual is rational.” G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 
12 (Allen W. Wood ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1821) [hereinafter 
HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT]. In Hyppolite’s words, “Hegelian philosophy rejects all tran-
scendence . . . . There is no world, nothing in itself, no transcendence.” JEAN HYPPOLITE, FIG-
URES DE LA PENSÉE PHILOSOPHIQUE 1 (1991). 
 59 SCHROEDER, FOUR DISCOURSES, supra note 50, at 14–15. 
 60 Jeanne L. Schroeder & David Gray Carlson, Psychoanalysis as the Jurisprudence of Free-
dom, in ON PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICAN LAW 139, 146 (Francis J. Mootz III ed., 2009). 
 61 Jacques-Alain Miller, Extimité (Françoise Massardier-Kenney trans.), in LACANIAN THEO-
RY OF DISCOURSE: SUBJECT, STRUCTURE, AND SOCIETY 74 (Mark Bracher et al. eds., 1994). 
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capacity for desire.62 Consequently, Lacan’s insight is that “alienation is 
not a condition that the self can overcome, even with the best therapy, 
but part of what fashions it from the ground up.”63 
Second, because the subject only became conscious and aware of 
his or her split when he or she matured and entered the symbolic order, 
the subject wrongly imagines that there really once was a time when he 
was not split (i.e., that alienation is a condition that one can overcome). 
Viewed from this fantasy, individuation is felt not so much as the gain 
that it is, but as a loss.64 This will lead to the intuition of the objet petit 
a. The subject desires. He incorrectly concludes that he desires because 
he lost something. He therefore tries to identify a missing object whose 
loss would seem to explain his desire—to function as its cause. In the 
retroactive logic of the psyche, the temporal relationship of cause and 
effect are reversed. That is, the fact of desire precedes the assignment of 
a “cause” of the desire.65 
 
III.     DEVELOPMENT 
A.     The Mirror Stage 
 
The first step in the process of individuation is “alienation” in the 
“mirror stage.” Psychoanalysis starts with a proposition that the new-
born has little if any awareness, certainly little if any consciousness, of 
where he ends and the outside world begins. Indeed, it is not even clear 
that the infant realizes that there is an outside world.66 At some point in 
the first few months of life, however, he begins to understand himself as 
a separate self by becoming aware of the existence of an “other.” This is 
initially a binary relationship between the infant and one other—the 
 
 62 SCHROEDER, FOUR DISCOURSES, supra note 50, at 18. 
 63 Perry Meisel, The Unanalyzable, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1997, § 7 (Book Review), at 12 
(reviewing ELISABETH ROUDINESCO, JACQUES LACAN (Barbara Bray trans., 1997)). 
 64 See supra text at notes 50–51. 
 65 In Žižek’s words 
A, the big Other, the symbolic order, is inherently “barred”, hindered, structured 
around the void of a central impossibility; it always falls short of its notion; this central 
impossibility is its condition of possibility, and the objet a is precisely the paradoxical 
object which gives body to this impossibility. In this precise sense, a is the object-
cause of desire: it does not effectively pre-exist desire as that which arouses it, it mere-
ly gives body to its inherent deadlock, to the fact that desire is never satisfied by any 
positive object; that is to say, apropos of every positive object, the subject’s experience 
will always be a “this is not that”. 
ŽIŽEK, INVISIBLE REMAINDER, supra note 27, at 144 (footnote omitted). 
 66 FINK, supra note 5, at 119 (“[T]here being, at the outset, no sense of ‘self,’ no sense of 
where one person or object leaves off and another begins . . . experience takes the form of a 
continuum, not of discrete, separate entities.”). 
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intuition that I am not that. The mirror stage is the discovery of the sub-
ject-object distinction. 
The first other is the mother (which, in English, can be punningly 
written as the mOther).67 More accurately, as the infant is not yet able to 
differentiate individual persons per se, the mOther is not really a moth-
er, but the maternal function that includes the infant’s entire external 
world at this stage of its emerging consciousness. Consequently, this 
role is not necessarily played by the infant’s biological mother, another 
woman, or even by a single person.68 
This identification of the other with the maternal is an example of 
the retroactive logic of the psyche. Almost every time I have spoken 
with a skeptic of psychoanalytic theory, he has prefaced his remarks 
with something like “this doesn’t apply to me because I was raised by 
[fill in the blank: father, grandmother, aunt, etc.] rather than by my 
mother.” From the psychoanalytic perspective the only relevant words 
in this sentence are “rather than by my mother.” This is an implicit ad-
mission that the adult speaker now recognizes that his caretaker was 
performing a role that our society ascribes to mothers.69 
Prior to the mirror stage the infant does not yet recognize either it-
self or the mOther as a person because it does not yet have awareness of 
selfhood. Rather, the mirror stage is the first realization that it is an enti-
ty distinct from the everything else—literally that this hand is part of 
me, but that breast (the voice that I hear, the fuzzy blanket I feel, etc.) is 
not.70 
Prior to the mirror stage the infant just had needs (e.g., to eat, to 
sleep) that were either met or not met.71 In the mirror stage need is now 
supplemented by demand.72 Demands are different from needs in that 
they are always addressed to another person. That is, the infant now 
 
 67 Id. at 232 n.8. 
 68 As Alfredo Eidelsztein states, “‘mother’ is a function that could be fulfilled by the father or 
the grand-mother.” ALFREDO EIDELSZTEIN, THE GRAPH OF DESIRE: USING THE WORK OF 
JACQUES LACAN 4 (2009). That is, “‘[m]other’ and ‘father’ are places the structure, structural 
functions that can be fulfilled by any person no matter the biological relationship he or she has or 
has not with the subject.” Id. at 17 n.5. 
 69 See, e.g., Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1983). I criticize 
this approach in SCHROEDER, VESTAL, supra note 25, at 70–72. 
 70 Initially, Lacan seemed to have thought that the infant’s growing awareness of his individ-
uated bodily integrity arose in part when he literally first recognized himself in a mirror. Over 
time Lacan moved away from such literal-mindedness in favor of a more abstract analysis. The 
infant sees himself figuratively mirrored back in his mother’s recognition of, and response to, his 
actions. Insofar as actual mirrors are involved, it is because mothers frequently hold infants up to 
a mirror to see their own reflection, saying things like “Who’s that in the mirror? It’s you!” The 
infant, however, would be reacting less to his own image than to the reflected image of his moth-
er’s reaction to his reaction. FINK, supra note 5, at 88. In Eidelsztein’s words, “it is not the mirror, 
but in the mother’s look when turning around, where the infant finds the captivated image.” 
EIDELSZTEIN, supra note 68, at 4. 
 71 ELIZABETH GROSZ, JACQUES LACAN: A FEMINIST INTRODUCTION 59–60 (1990). 
 72 Id. at 61. 
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addresses the mOther and demands that she fill its needs for food, pro-
tection, and, most importantly, attention. Perhaps more importantly, the 
infant starts becoming aware that the mOther makes demands upon it.73 
Being completely dependent on the all-powerful mOther, the infant 
fixates on how it can meet these demands. 
A recent pop-psychology book called The Philosophical Baby74 
seeks to counter the supposedly common misimpression that infants are 
inert mindless creatures who only later learn to think.75 According to 
this book, infants are engaged in the intense intellectual work of trying 
to figure out their place in the world from the day they are born (and 
perhaps earlier). 
Without wishing to address this book on its specifics, Lacanian 
theory responds, in effect: How could anyone suppose otherwise? An 
infant’s entire waking life (and presumably dream work) consists of 
(psycho)analytical activity. Lacanians go so far as to say that infants are 
natural (and the most effective) psychoanalysts, constantly interpreting 
those around them.76 To a Lacanian, the typical young toddler’s con-
stant questioning is not merely innocent curiosity—it is a deadly earnest 
life-and-death struggle.77 That is, in the mirror stage, the helpless infant 
begins to realize that his physical survival is at the mercy of the mOther. 
Although we sentimentalize maternal love as perfect and uncondi-
tional, the relationship of infant and the mOther has an aggressive and 
antagonistic side. The infant, being so dependent on the mother, fears 
her as much as he loves her. In Lacan’s grotesque metaphor: “A huge 
crocodile in whose jaws you are—that’s the mother. One never knows 
what might suddenly come over her and make her shut her trap. That’s 
what the mother’s desire is.”78 
This is perhaps partly because the infant-analyst understands that 
actual parents always harbor some hostile feelings toward the little 
stranger that has so drastically disrupted their lives. It is partly because 
 
 73 FINK, supra note 5, at 177–78. 
 74 ALISON GOPNIK, THE PHILOSOPHICAL BABY: WHAT CHILDREN’S MINDS TELL US ABOUT 
TRUTH, LOVE, AND THE MEANING OF LIFE (2009). 
 75 I personally find it hard to believe that anyone who has ever seen a human infant could 
believe this, let alone believe that it is a belief commonly held by others. 
 76 In the words of child psychoanalyst Catherine Mathelin, “[c]hildren are always in a posi-
tion to be their parents’ therapists, which, as we well know, is not necessarily a good thing for 
them.” CATHERINE MATHELIN, LACANIAN PSYCHOTHERAPY WITH CHILDREN: THE BROKEN 
PIANO 181 (1999). 
 77 Accordingly, Lacanian analysts believe that they can (and sometimes should) begin treat-
ing troubled children at extremely young ages—within weeks or even days of birth—when they 
start exhibiting symptoms of their parents’ repressed traumas. As Mathelin says, “babies do 
‘understand’ what is said to them. Clinical practice with infants seems to offer fresh proof of this 
every day.” Id. at 162. 
 78 JACQUES LACAN, THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN, BOOK XVII: THE OTHER SIDE OF 
PSYCHOANALYSIS 112 (Jacques-Alain Miller ed., Russell Grigg trans., W.W. Norton & Co. 
2007). 
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he fears that the mother will fail to meet his demands and he will starve. 
But, in addition, the infant literally fears being engulfed.79 The infant 
incorrectly abducts from the fact that he is only now becoming aware 
that the mOther is alien, there must have been a time in the past when 
they were one.80 Perhaps mOther might try to reestablish this earlier 
stage. Consequently, the infant is desperate to learn and meet her de-
mands not only because he loves her, and not only because he wants her 
to reciprocate, but because the infant is terrified that if he doesn’t sate 
her, she will eat him. 
(Re)union with the mOther is, therefore, a possibility to be both 
desired and feared. On the one hand, separation is experienced as a loss. 
The infant becomes aware that he does not merely have needs that may 
or may not be filled by some unknown process. The infant learns that 
fulfillment is either bestowed or withheld by mOther who may or may 
not be hostile. Needs are now supplemented by demands that must be 
addressed to someone. Consequently, demand contains within it the 
possibility of rejection. 
As such, the infant is not only in the jaws of a crocodile, he is on 
the horns of a dilemma.81 On the one hand, alienation is a gain. It is the 
first step in becoming a free independent subject capable of self-
actualization. On the other, merging back with mOther could be an ec-
static reacquisition of a lost state of integrity before the possibility of 
rejection. He both wants to keep his new-found consciousness while 
also rejoining with mOther. Perhaps he can do this by engulfing mOther 
before she can engulf him. But, if he destroys her, he destroys the be-
loved mirror that he needs to see himself. This vicious circle that is the 
human condition results in an erotic excitement that is to be both de-
sired and feared, of pleasure in pain and pain in pleasure, called jouis-
sance—a term of art only roughly equivalent to its closest English cog-
nate, “enjoyment.”82 
The mirror stage is when the infant enters the “imaginary” order. 
The imaginary is, as the term implies, the realm of images. It is the 
stage where the infant first creates a self-image that will eventually be-
come his ego.83 The imaginary reflects the binary structural logic of the 
mirror stage. The imaginary is the order of simple either-or dualism in 
 
 79 FINK, supra note 5, at 173, 177–78. 
 80 In fact, “[t]here is no mother-infant symbiosis, since from the out set there exists a third 
term, a lack on the basis of which all interaction is organized . . . . ‘Before the child is 
born . . . [t]here is already alienation’.” MATHELIN, supra note 76, at 152 (quoting Solange 
Faladé). 
 81 This dreadful aspect of the mOther is perfectly captured in the character of the Other 
Mother in the animated film CORALINE (Focus Features, Laika Entertainment & Pandemonium 
2009) based on the children’s book by Neil Gaiman. Despite the Lacanian-sounding name, I have 
no reason to think that Gaiman has any knowledge of Lacanian theory. 
 82 FINK, supra note 5, at 8–9; SCHROEDER, VESTAL, supra note 25, at 96–97. 
 83 FINK, supra note 5, at 250 n.44. 
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which the choices are either complete conflict or complete harmony.84 
The mature subject will only emerge when the child enters the “symbol-
ic” which will supersede, but not eliminate, the imaginary. 
 
B.     The Oedipal Stage 
1.     One and One Implies Three 
 
The second stage in the process of “individuation” is the “Oedipal 
stage,” in which the duality of the imaginary is supplemented by a third 
term. If the binary figure is the mother, the tertiary is the father. The 
existence of the third creates the symbolic order of complex intersubjec-
tive relations. 
Lacan sometimes calls the paternal function the “Name-of-the-
Father”85 because it is symbolic, and therefore grammatical (and legal) 
in nature. The paternal function is to give the law that will bring the 
child into the symbolic order of adults.86 The “first” law written in the 
Oedipal stage will be the law as prohibition. This is the paternal “No!”87 
as in “No, you cannot be one with the mother, so you must give up your 
fantasy and nightmare of reuniting with her, become individuated, and 
take on your role in society as a subject!” This is Lacan’s rewriting of 
Freud’s notorious “incest taboo.” 
The paternal function was latent in the mirror stage. But it existed 
only as the fact of the cut between baby and world. In the Oedipal stage, 
it begins to function as an independent presence.88 
Once again, the paternal role is not the same thing as an empirical 
father. In the traditional patriarchal family, the empirical father is sup-
posed to play the role of lawgiver. But the paternal function is per-
formed by any person or institution whose negative presence interferes 
in the relationship of the infant and the maternal figure in his life.89 In 
order to be paternal, one does not have to act as the archetypically stern 
patriarch. 
A person can be a “father” who prohibits the child’s reunion with 
the mother merely by taking up some of the mother’s time and affec-
tion.90 By serving as the object of the mother’s desire, the “father’s” 
 
 84 Fink emphasizes the role of rivalry in the imaginary order. Id. at 32. 
 85 Id. at 80. 
 86 Id. at 79–81. 
 87 Id. at 81–82. 
 88 Id. at 91. 
 89 Id. at 79 (“This function may be fulfilled despite the early death or disappearance of the 
father due to war or divorce; it may be filled by another man who becomes a ‘father figure’; and it 
may be fulfilled in other ways as well.”). 
 90 Indeed, as Fink notes, because “[t]he paternal function is a symbolic function [it] can be 
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very existence shows the child that it is impossible for the child to 
merge with her (in that she belongs partly to the father).91 But more 
importantly, it means that his mother is not the all-powerful, all-
encompassing, terrifying, wondrous, child-obliterating, crocodilian 
mOther-thing of his fantasies.92 She is just a subject. This is the moment 
when the child first starts to develop the lexigraphic concept of lack. 
The child comes to realize that mother not merely demands, she 
desires. The child hypothesizes from this that she must lack something 
that is desirable. The fact that she desires the father suggests that he 
might have that thing. To Lacan, it is this (retroactive) abduction, not 
the sight of genital difference, that accounts for the reason why we as-
sociate castration (lack) with the maternal and lack of castration with 
the paternal. This is why Lacan adopts the Freudian term of art for the 
hypothesized “thing” that the maternal function lacks (and desires) and 
the paternal function supposedly has—the “phallus.” Only retroactively, 
when the child recognizes that our society identifies the paternal role 
with the male parent and the maternal role with the female parent, will 
the child conflate the phallus with the anatomical organ that males have 
and females lack. Lacan’s confusing terminology is designed to repli-
cate this conflation. 
Merely by serving as a third, the father disrupts the simple black-
and-white, dualistic order of the imaginary. The world does not consist 
of just infant and everything else. The existence of a third suggests a 
multiplicity, perhaps an infinity, of possibilities. The child is no longer 
doomed to be his mother’s mirror image and antagonist. He can now 
seek to be individuated as a unique subject so that he can love her also 
as a subject. He now seeks not merely to fill his own needs, nor meet 
the mother’s demands, but to confront both the child’s and the mother’s 
desire. 
 
just as effective when the father is temporarily absent as when he is present . . . . The paternal 
function . . . is served by the noun ‘father’ insofar as the mother refers to it as an authority beyond 
herself an ideal beyond her own wishes (though in certain cases she may be appealing to it simply 
to prop up or lend credence to her own wishes).” Id. at 81. 
 91 Id. at 80 (“[T]he father keeps the child at a certain distance from its mother, thwarting the 
child’s attempt to become one or remain forever one with the mother, or forbidding the mother 
from achieving satisfactions with her child, or both.”). 
 92 As Eidelsztein explains, this dynamic is also seen in the common fury a two- or three-year-
old child experiences when his mother doesn’t understand what he says. This does not represent 
frustration with his own ability to communicate: 
It is not the fact of not being understood, but the recognition that the language . . . is 
not of the mother. That is, that the mother does not understand the mother tongue. That 
is why they despair. The incomprehension of the mother undermines her omnipotence: 
the omnipotence whose attack anguishes him the most, the other’s not his. For the child 
it is not the undermining of his own omnipotence what anguishes him, rather the Oth-
er’s. 
EIDELSZTEIN, supra note 68, at 61. 
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The introduction of the paternal function is not only the beginning 
of law, it is the beginning of language. The paternal “no” is a metaphor 
in the sense that the father’s “no” takes the place of the mother as the 
source of the child’s jouissance.93 From now on the child will not have 
an immediate access to jouissance. Jouissance will be mediated by the 
symbolic—the intersubjective order of social relations, including law, 
language, and sexual identity. 
 
2.     The Big Other 
 
The demand encountered in the mirror stage is now supplemented 
in the Oedipal stage with desire. Indeed, subjectivity is nothing but the 
capacity of desire.94 The subject desires because he lacks—in Lacan’s 
terminology, he is split or castrated. Desire can never be fulfilled pre-
cisely because language prevents us from ever achieving the immediacy 
that we associate with our memories of being one with the mother prior 
to the mirror stage. 
Let’s step back. We are obviously a long way away from Freudian 
theory. To oversimplify, we have seen how in the mirror stage the infant 
not only makes demands on the mOther, he is an analyst of her de-
mands. He wants to meet her demands not only so she will meet his, but 
also so she will not turn on him and engulf him. In the Oedipal stage, 
this demand will be overwritten by the desire for recognition and love. 
Following Hegel, Lacan argues that one becomes a subject when 
one is recognized as such by a fellow subject. This is why subjectivity 
requires the symbolic order of intersubjective relationships.95 Conse-
quently, the child, who desires to be desired, wishes to grow up and be 
recognized as a member of society. In order to mature the child must 
submit to the laws that constitute society, learn language, and take on a 
sexual identity. 
As a result of this, as the child matures into a subject, he encoun-
ters the uncanny experience of extimacy. That which is most himself—
personhood, subjectivity—comes from the outside—from others, from 
the symbolic order. This is one reason why he experiences himself as 
split. Although subjectivity is a gain (i.e., the achievement of identity), 
it is experienced as a loss. 
In the mirror stage, the infant confronted a single other—the rest of 
the world perceived as a monolithic maternal function. Now, as he starts 
 
 93 FINK, supra note 5, at 91. 
 94 SCHROEDER, FOUR DISCOURSES, supra note 50, at 18. 
 95 This parallel between Lacan and Hegel is the subject of the first chapter of SCHROEDER, 
VESTAL, supra note 25, ch. 1. 
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entering adulthood, the defining otherness is replaced by the symbolic 
order itself, sometimes referred to as the Big Other96 or just the Other.97 
Because this Other (the symbolic order) is made of subjects, and 
because all subjects are split, the symbolic order itself is defined by the 
same split. Individuation requires that each subject become identifiable. 
This means that each subject must become distinct from every other, 
unique and individuated. Paradoxically, this means that the symbolic 
order’s own existence requires that each of its members not be perfectly 
integrated into society—we remain alienated not only from ourselves, 
but separated from others. 
The imaginary order created in the mirror stage was one of either-
or, black-white, simple binary oppositions. This also implicitly means 
that the imaginary order is imagined as complete—the whole world 
consisted of infant and mOther. Being complete also means it is closed 
and static. 
By contrast, all symbolic relationships—including language, law, 
markets and sexual identity—can never be closed and whole in the way 
the primal fantasies of the imaginary are. Rather, they are imperfect, 
incomplete, and unsatisfying. Language and law are necessarily ambig-
uous for logical and functional, not merely practical, reasons.98 But this 
means that the symbolic is also open and dynamic. Nevertheless, the 
imaginary order will not be replaced by the symbolic order, just over-
written by it. The imaginary will remain in our fantasies of the possibil-
ity of obtaining completeness. We will return to this because obsession 
is based on precisely such fantasies. 
As we have seen, Lacan retains Freud’s anatomical vocabulary and 
says that the subject is castrated and has lost the phallus. The terminolo-
gy of castration captures a number of important aspects of the theory. 
The first is that individuation is felt as a loss not a gain. Second, this 
loss is experienced as an imagined lost state of wholeness or integrity, a 
oneness of the world imagined as the maternal. This leads to the fantasy 
that one could reattain integrity if one could acquire the lost thing.99 
That is, that one’s desire is caused by the lack of an object and could be 
 
 96 SCHROEDER, FOUR DISCOURSES, supra note 50, at 15. 
 97 FINK, supra note 5, at 232 n.8. Note, the Other stands not only for the intersubjective 
regime in which the subject is located, but for other subjects that make up that regime. 
 98 SCHROEDER, FOUR DISCOURSES, supra note 50, at 9, 41, 116–20. 
 99 That is, “the subject calls for recognition on the appropriate level of authentic symbolic 
exchange—which is not so easy to attain since it’s always interfered with—is replaced by a 
recognition of the imaginary, of fantasy.” JACQUES LACAN, THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN, 
BOOK III: THE PSYCHOSES, 1955–1956, at 15 (Jacques-Alain Miller ed., Russell Grigg trans., 
W.W. Norton & Co. 1993) [hereinafter LACAN, SEMINAR III]; see also SCHROEDER, VESTAL, 
supra note 25, at 109. In Lacan’s words, “[t]he fantasy is the support of desire; it is not the object 
that is the support of desire.” JACQUES LACAN, THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN, BOOK XI: 
THE FOUR FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 185 (Jacques-Alain Miller ed., Alan 
Sheridan trans., W.W. Norton & Co. 1978) [hereinafter LACAN, SEMINAR XI]. 
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sated by acquisition of that object.100 This is the logic that, at its ex-
treme, becomes obsession.101 Finally, the metaphor of castration implies 
that we experience our current state as being caused by someone that 
did something violent to us.102 To a certain extent this is correct in the 
sense that “castration” is the result of submitting to the intersubjective 
realm of relationships with other people that is inevitably ruled by 
grammar imposed upon us and laws of behavior that restrain our ac-
tions. 
The two sexes are just two different ways of dealing with this uni-
versal sense of lack. The punch line, however, is that there is no thing 
missing. Our abduction that the reason why we feel lacking is because 
we lack something is objectively wrong. The phallus does not exist. It is 
the symbol for the subject, but the subject itself is pure negativity—the 
capacity of desire. It is lexigraphic in the sense that it stands for a lack 
that we cannot perceive directly but can only hypothesize retroactively 
from the perspective of a specific symbolic position.103 
Another definition of the phallus is the lack of a lack. In the “natu-
ral” world, to negate a negation is to create something positive. This 
logic of the double negative leads to the abduction of the objet petit a. 
Lacan’s logic of the phallus is, however, that of imaginary numbers. He 
notoriously said that the phallus is the square root of negative one—the 
definition of an “imaginary” number. This is precisely correct. The 
phallus is a concept so negative that, paradoxically, even when multi-
plied by itself, remains negative.104 The fantasy of the objet petit a is an 
attempt to positivize this lack. 
 
 100 The objet petit a is “the chimerical object of Fantasy, the object causing our desire and at 
the same time—this is the paradox—posed retroactively by this desire.” ŽIŽEK, SUBLIME OBJECT, 
supra note 49, at 65. “The paradox of desire is that it posits retroactively its own cause, i.e., the 
object a . . . .” SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK, LOOKING AWRY: AN INTRODUCTION TO JACQUES LACAN 
THROUGH POPULAR CULTURE 12 (1992) [hereinafter ŽIŽEK, LOOKING AWRY]; see also SLAVOJ 
ŽIŽEK, THE ABYSS OF FREEDOM/AGES OF THE WORLD 79 (1997) [hereinafter ŽIŽEK, ABYSS OF 
FREEDOM]. 
 101 See infra text at notes 133, 163–64. 
 102 SCHROEDER, VENUS, supra note 11, at 79–80. 
 103 To draw on Lacan’s example, if one were to see two books marked “Vol. I” and “Vol. II,” 
a space, and a third book marked “Vol. IV,” one could not see that Vol. III is missing. This is 
because the concept of “missing” requires that one is already located within a specific symbolic 
system. However, one might abduct from one’s knowledge of the convention of numbering books 
in a series coupled with one’s knowledge of Roman numerals that there is probably a book 
marked “Vol. III,” that it would conventionally be stored in the space between the books marked 
“Vol. II” and Vol. IV,” and, ergo, there is probably a hypothetical Vol. III that is missing. In other 
words, a lack can only be retroactively posited from some future perspective. Lack is a concept 
that can only be expressed in the future perfect—I do not see a lack, but after thought, I will have 
seen it. FINK, supra note 5, at 177. 
 104 Literal-minded critics, assuming that the phallus is the male organ, hold this statement up 
to particular scorn. ALAN SOKAL & JEAN BRICMONT, FASHIONABLE NONSENSE: POSTMODERN 
INTELLECTUALS’ ABUSE OF SCIENCE (1998). Lacan’s metaphor is an attempt to capture the 
radical negativity of subjectivity that is symbolized by the phallus. When the subject invents the 
concept of the phallus, she is using the logic of the double negative. That is, the subject feels she 
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3.     Law and Sexuality 
 
Freud posited that the Oedipal family romance is “resolved” and 
mature sexuality created when the child submits to the primal law of the 
incest taboo. To Freud this is, quite literally, the patriarchal injunction 
that thou shalt not kill the father, or have sex with the mother.105 Freud 
took this so seriously that, in Totem and Taboo106 and again in Moses 
and Monotheism,107 he argues that the first human societies were creat-
ed when a band of brothers literally murdered (and ate) their tyrannical 
father in order to get access to his wives (i.e., their mothers and sisters). 
Subsequently, out of guilt, they wrote laws to prohibit these crimes. 
That is, the brothers wrote the law against incest retroactively to explain 
their guilt for acts that were not yet crimes at the time they were com-
mitted.108 
Once again, Lacan keeps Freud’s vocabulary, but rewrites his im-
aginary account as a symbolic function. The child becomes an adult by 
submitting to the symbolic order of language and law, thereby achieving 
subjectivity and sexual identity.109 The patriarchal injunction of the in-
cest taboo is now a paternal metaphor110—something that substitutes for 
something else. Freud’s “thou shalt not have sexual relations with your 
mother” is now “you must give up the dream of merging back with the 
maternal.” “Thou shalt not kill your father” becomes “identify with the 
symbolic order of social relations and become a subject.” This law of 
the father prohibits and, thereby, takes the place of the mother as source 
of jouissance (i.e., erotic excitement). The law of prohibition, therefore, 
enables desire to function precisely by prohibiting the satisfaction of 
desire. This is a very complex concept that we cannot fully explore here 
but will touch on very briefly later. 
 
is negative and lacking and assumes that this is because something is lacking. The subject wants 
to negate this feeling of negation—she wants to replace her lack with a lack of a lack. Under 
ordinary real number mathematics, a negative multiplied by a positive, i.e., the lack of a lack, 
produces a positive. This suggests, ergo, that phallus (the lack of a lack) must be something 
affirmative that someone (i.e., men) could have. However, the vision of integrity is a fantasy, it is 
imaginary not symbolic. The phallus never existed. The logic of imaginary numbers is phallic in 
this sense. The square root of negative one cannot exist because it is that which is so negative that 
it remains negative even when it is multiplied by itself. Although the square root of negative one 
cannot exist, the entire field of quantum mechanics requires that we act as though it does. This is 
the logic of the phallus. 
 105 SIGMUND FREUD, TOTEM AND TABOO 152–53, 177–78 (James Strachey trans., 1952) 
[hereinafter FREUD, T & T]. 
 106 See id. 
 107 SIGMUND FREUD, MOSES AND MONOTHEISM (Katherine Jones trans., 1939) [hereinafter 
FREUD, M & M]. 
 108 FREUD, T & T, supra note 105, at 177–78. 
 109 SCHROEDER, FOUR DISCOURSES, supra note 50, at 15–17. 
 110 FINK, supra note 5, at 91. 
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Freud is a utilitarian in the sense that he seems to think that the 
reason why the child accepts the patriarchal bargain is because the fa-
ther promises a satisfaction that compensates for the loss of the moth-
er.111 Lacan is not so sanguine. When the child gives up the maternal, he 
receives split subjectivity—the negative status of pure desire. Desire is 
nothing but the lack of satisfaction.112 
To Freud, the two sexes are defined by castration: the normal fe-
male is castrated and the normal male avoids castration. To Lacan, cas-
tration is the universal initiation rite of subjectivity. The two sexuated 
positions are two inconsistent ways of confronting this shared reality—
denial versus acceptance.113 “Men” are not necessarily anatomically 
male humans, but those subjects who cannot face the fact that they are 
castrated. They claim to be whole and complete despite all evidence to 
the contrary.114 This is a fantasy, an attempt to remain totally within the 
imaginary. One strategy that “men” use to maintain this fantasy is ob-
session, to which we will soon turn. 
Similarly, “women” are not necessarily anatomically female hu-
mans, but those subjects who accept their fate, and face the awful 
truth.115 One result of this can be hysteria.116 I explicate the feminine 
position extensively elsewhere and, in this Article, consider hysteria 
only insofar as it is necessary to contrast it with obsession. 
 
IV.     MENTAL SYNDROMES 
A.     Structural Distinctions 
 
As introduced,117 in contrast to mainstream American psychology, 
Lacan’s diagnostic schemata does not emphasize the specific symptoms 
exhibited by the analysand. Instead, they are structural: the three basic 
diagnostic categories of psychosis, perversion, and neurosis relate to the 
 
 111 RENATA SALECL, THE SPOILS OF FREEDOM: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND FEMINISM AFTER THE 
FALL OF SOCIALISM 102 (1994). 
 112 As Fink says, the father “never offered [the child] anything in return [i.e., for giving into 
the paternal prohibition], never provided [him] with substitute satisfactions.” FINK, supra note 5, 
at 93; see also SCHROEDER, VESTAL, supra note 25, at 85; SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK, FOR THEY KNOW NOT 
WHAT THEY DO: ENJOYMENT AS A POLITICAL FACTOR 230–31 (1991) [hereinafter ŽIŽEK, FOR 
THEY KNOW NOT WHAT THEY DO]. 
 113 SCHROEDER, FOUR DISCOURSES, supra note 50, 15–17. In the word’s of Jacques-Alain 
Miller, “[h]ysteria presents the divided subject at its purest. Such a subject assumes its division. 
The obsessional, on the contrary, conceals this division, tries to mop it up, attempts to annul it.” 
Jacques-Alain Miller, H20: Suture in Obsessionality, THE SYMPTOM, Spring 2003, 
http://www.lacan.com/suturef.htm. 
 114 SCHROEDER, FOUR DISCOURSES, supra note 50, 127. 
 115 Id. at 151–52. 
 116 LACAN, SEMINAR VII, supra note 26, at 53. 
 117 See supra text at notes 43–47. 
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two developmental stages. The psychotic enters the mirror stage, but 
never finds the exit.118 He remains imprisoned in the black-and-white, 
either-or nightmare of the mirror world’s threat of eat or be eaten. As 
such, he can descend into homicidal destruction. The pervert, unlike the 
psychotic, leaves the hall of mirrors and enters the Oedipal phase. Un-
like the neurotic, the pervert is unsuccessful in negotiating the contract 
that releases him from the sexual panic of the family romance and into 
the symbolic order.119 The three perversions—sadism, masochism and 
fetishism—are three ways the pervert endlessly and unsuccessfully tries 
to establish a law to complete castration and cut him loose from the ties 
that bind.120 
Those of us who are alienated in the mirror stage and separated in 
the Oedipal stage end up as subjects who are, in most cases, neurotic, to 
some extent or another. Most of us are able to handle our neuroses most 
of the time, despite occasional twinges of loneliness, self-doubt, etc. 
Indeed, it is one of Lacan’s fundamental points that we actually enjoy 
the neurotic symptoms that we unconsciously cultivate over our lives.121 
As introduced, jouissance (enjoyment) is a term of art that designates 
not pleasure, but an erotic excitement associated with the fantasy of re-
uniting with the maternal. Consequently, it is not that our symptoms 
make us happy, but that they give us a certain short-lived thrill.122 
When the neurotic experiences a break, however, his or her symp-
toms stop working, he or she can no longer get off on them. When the 
neurotic seeks “help” from a therapist, it is not because he or she wants 
to be cured in the sense of losing his or her symptom. Rather, he or she 
wants the symptom to be fixed so that he or she can go back to the way 
things were.123 
 
B.     Objet Petit A 
 
Lacan thought the object cause of desire (the objet petit a) was his 
most important innovation in psychoanalytic theory.124 Certainly it is 
 
 118 FINK, supra note 5, at 87–90. 
 119 Id. at 175–76. 
 120 Note that the term of art “perversion” does not have the colloquial meaning of sexual 
weirdness. Rather, like neurosis and psychosis, it refers to a specific relationship the subject can 
have with law. It is thought that as an empirical matter, a large majority of perverts are males. 
 121 Fink starts his Clinical Introduction with the old joke “How many psychoanalysts does it 
take to change a light bulb? Only one, but the lightbulb must really want to change.” FINK, supra 
note 5, at 1. This caricature of American Freudian practice is inapt to Lacanianism, which holds 
that analysands never want to change because they love their symptoms. 
 122 FINK, supra note 5, at 8–10. 
 123 Id. at 8–10. 
 124 FINK, SUBJECT, supra note 57, at 83 (“With object a, Lacan felt he had made his most 
significant contribution to psychoanalysis. Few concepts in Lacanian opus are elaborated so 
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one of his most difficult concepts and one that he constantly refined and 
modified over his career. Consequently, we will only skate over certain 
aspects of the idea most directly related to the points made in this Arti-
cle. To do this, we shall return to Lacan’s theory of development, this 
time illustrated by a set of diagrams developed by Fink. 
To repeat, prior to alienation in the mirror stage the infantile pre-







In the mirror stage, the child sees itself as being differentiated (al-
ienated) from the mother, but not yet completely separated from her. 
The child’s world now consists of self and other. The protopaternal 
function is not yet broken out as a third element, but merely exists as the 
boundary of alienation.126 
 
extensively, revised so significantly . . . , [and] worked over from so many different perspec-
tives . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
 125 FINK, supra note 5, at 91. 
 126 Id. at 92. 
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During the Oedipal stage, the child becomes separated from other 
persons and the fantasy memory of the imagined lost union takes on an 
independent role. This precipitates out as a trace, a lost thing.127 This is 
designated by the little a (for the French word for other, i.e., autre). 
Consequently, the person who passes through the Oedipal stage can be 
diagramed as such.128 
 
 127 Id. at 119. 
 128 Id. 
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The child is now a subject. The Big Other of the symbolic order of 
relationships with others substitutes for the mother as original other. We 
have a fraught relationship with the Big Other. On the one hand, we 
desire it because it created our individuated sense of self that is the pre-
condition of freedom. On the other hand, we hate it because its very 
existence thwarts our competing desire to merge back with the mother 
and achieve wholeness. 
The paradox that the subject is simultaneously individuated and al-
ienated from, and dependent on, the social order is represented by the 
overlap. The fantasy trace of merger—the a—lies in this overlap.129 
The problem is that, just as the original union with the maternal is 
a fantasy, so is the objet petit a an imaginary trace of this nonexistent 
 
 129 In Žižek’s words: 
However, what we must avoid at any price is conceiving of this left-over as simply 
secondary, as if we have first the substantial fullness of the Real and then the process 
of symbolization which “evacuates” jouissance, yet not entirely, leaving behind isolat-
ed remainders, islands of enjoyment, objets petit a. If we succumb to this notion, we 
lose the paradox of the Lacanian Real: there is no substance of enjoyment without, pri-
or to, the surplus of enjoyment. The substance is a mirage retroactively invoked by the 
surplus. The illusion that pertains to a qua surplus-enjoyment is therefore the very illu-
sion that, behind it, there is the lost substance of jouissance in other words, a qua sem-
blance deceives in a Lacanian way: not because it is a deceitful substitute of the Real, 
but precisely because it invokes the impression of some substantial Real behind it; it 
deceives by posing as a shadow of the underlying Real. 
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK, TARRYING WITH THE NEGATIVE: KANT, HEGEL, AND THE CRITIQUE OF IDEOLO-
GY 36–37 (1993) (footnote omitted). 
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unity. Nevertheless, the subject searches for an actual object that can 
serve the function of the missing object.130 The logic here is the abduc-
tion that the reason I desire must be because I am missing something. If 
I could just identify which missing thing is causing my desire, then I 
can sate my desire by acquiring that thing. Of course, the search for 
such an object is necessarily vain because the object cause of desire is 
imaginary. If one were to acquire the actual object identified by the 
subject, one would have to confront the fact that one still desired and, 
therefore, that the particular object does not explain one’s desire. One 
would have to find another object to take the place of the first in one’s 
fantasies. This is one reason why it is best to identify an obscure object 
of desire that can never be truly captured. 
Once again, this helps explain how the elusive bonus can perfectly 
serve as an objet petit a—one never completely captures it even when 
one acquires it. That is, as an annual recognition of worth, the trader is 
always looking forward to next year’s bonus even as he receives this 
year’s. Moreover, the value of each bonus exists in its relative size not 
only in relation toward bonuses given to others, but to the size of the 
previous year’s bonus. Consequently, the obsessive trader can sustain 
his fantasy that the bonus causes his desire, even as though (or, perhaps, 
just because) the bonus never satisfies. 
Even the vocabulary of the “bonus” supports this interpretation. 
Although the Latin word merely means a good thing, and, in fact, Wall 
Street bonuses are frequently contractually obligated, the connotation of 
the English word is something more, over and above, what is ex-
pected.131 
Fink’s diagrams might suggest that after alienation we are left with 
two complete but overlapping circles. This is precisely the misinterpre-
tation formed in the imaginary. Not only the subject, but the Big Other 
of the symbolic order, which is just an unstable coalition of subjects, are 
split and incomplete.132 Their point of overlap is, in fact, this shared 
lack. 
Consequently, we can make this clear by separating the two “cir-
cles” as follows. 
 
 130 In Eidelsztein’s words, “we permanently want to make the two-dimensional [i.e., imagi-
nary] object a three-dimensional. Why? In order to find it in the real world.” EIDELSZTEIN, supra 
note 68, at 7. 
 131 I thank Heidi Feldman for this insight. 
 132 Consequently, Lacan eventually replaced the “A” that was his symbol for the Other (stand-
ing for the French Autre) with a barred “%.” This bar that splits the “A” is the same bar that splits 
the matheme of the subject (∃). SCHROEDER, FOUR DISCOURSES, supra note 50, at 15. 
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C.     Sexuation 
 
The true desire of any subject is to become whole, and to cease de-
siring while retaining the freedom and self-consciousness of subjectivi-
ty. Wholeness is imagined as reunion with the maternal universe. This is 
paradoxical because regressing back before separation would be the 
destruction of subjectivity. This is an “impossible” situation. The sub-
ject’s desires are, therefore, contradictory and impossible. Consequent-
ly, the subject looks for a way out of this whirlpool of desire. 
Both obsession and hysteria are unsuccessful attempts to solve the 
dilemma of subjectivity and desire by choosing one horn and forgetting 
about the other. The masculine subject tries to deny his dependence on 
others, to deny desire, in order to claim to be whole. The feminine sub-
ject admits her dependence on others and seeks to become whole by 
satisfying the other. Both sexes do this through the fantasy of the objet 
petit a: the object cause of desire that acts as the imaginary substitute 
for the symbolic (lost) phallus. Once again, these “sexuated” positions 
are structural, legal, or logical, not biological. Although as an empirical 
matter males are more likely to tend toward the masculine position, and 
females toward the feminine, persons of either anatomic sex or sexual 
orientation can be a “man” or a “woman.” Or more importantly, no sub-
ject can be completely a man or a woman. We all vacillate between the 
two sexuated positions. 
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The subject, in effect, tries to complete one of the two circles of the 
subject and the Other. To do this, the subject not only tries to fill in the 
missing piece of the chosen incomplete circle with the objet petit a, he 
or she also represses the existence of the rejected incomplete circle. The 
masculine neurosis of obsession is the attempt to complete the left-hand 
circle of subjectivity and ignore the right-hand circle of the Other. The 
man, who can’t face the fact of his own castration, tries to obtain an 









The feminine position of hysteria is the attempt to complete the 
right-hand circle representing the big Other and repress her own subjec-
tivity. The hysteric subject, therefore, seeks to be the object cause of the 
Other’s desire.134 
 
 133 FINK, supra note 5, at 120. “In the obsessive’s fantasy . . . unity or wholeness is restored to 
the subject by addition of the object.” Id. at 119. 
 134 Id. at 120. 
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In other words the “obsessive attempts to overcome or reverse the 
effects of separation on the subject, whereas the hysteric attempts to 
overcome or reverse the effects of separation on the Other.”135 
 
D.     Obsession 
 
We are finally in the position to discuss the neurosis of the trader 
culture. It may be tempting to assume that both the inflation of the bub-
ble economy and its subsequent popping are examples of hysteria. This 
is because the colloquial definition of that term is somewhat different 
than the technical one. Rather, it is my thesis that the characteristic be-
havior of the classic banker and trader is obsessional and that the Great 
Recession resulted from an obsessional breakdown. This should not 
surprise us. From a psychoanalytic perspective, as Tom Wolfe’s expres-
sion “Masters of the Universe”136 implies, traders pride themselves on 
their machismo. Anecdotal evidence supports this interpretation. A 
“short, unscientific survey” by Esquire magazine during the 2010 bonus 
season found that, “[d]espite being 6.75% more likely to receive a bo-
 
 135 Id.  
 136 TOM WOLFE, THE BONFIRE OF THE VANITIES (1987). 
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nus, the men who didn’t receive bonuses were 24 times more likely to 
think it was ‘unfair’ [while] [o]f the nine women who received bonuses, 
five thought they were fair, three thought they deserved more, one 
thought she deserved less.”137 
Elsewhere, I argue that to be effective and ethical the practicing at-
torney needs to take on the “feminine” position of hysteria.138 Moreo-
ver, I have shown that Hegel’s theory of implicit “logic” of property, 
contract, and market relations is not merely erotic, but hysterically so.139 
Consequently, it would be a good thing if the financial markets were a 
little more, not less, hysteric. 
According to Hegel, the sublimely hysteric person acquires proper-
ty and engages in contractual relationships not for their own sake, as the 
obsessive thinks he does, but derivatively as a means of achieving his 
true desire—recognition by another subject.140 The legal relations of 
property and contract are means of achieving subjectivity by making 
oneself unique and, therefore, recognizable. The problem with the neu-
rotically hysterical subject is that she represses the “logic” of her posi-
tion. The subject desires the desire of the Other because he wants to 
become a subject. But by seeking to be the object of the Other’s desire, 
the hysterical subject denies herself and shirks the ethical mandate of 
subjectivity. 
By contrast, the obsessive denies his split by trying to deny his de-
pendence on the Big Other and fantasizes that he has the object cause of 
desire. 
As schematically represented . . . the obsessive takes the object for 
himself and refuses to recognize the Other’s existence, much less the 
Other’s desire. The obsessive’s fundamental fantasy can thus be ade-
quately formulated using Lacan’s general formula for the fundamen-
tal fantasy (∃ ◊ a), as long as it is understood that the obsessive seeks 
to neutralize or annihilate the Other.141 
The obsessive claims to be whole and uncastrated. He wants to be 
an entirely conscious thinker with no unconscious, completely aware of 
his thoughts and in control of his actions. 
[T]he obsessive’s [primary question] is “Am I dead or alive?” The 
obsessive is convinced that he is, that he exists, only when he is con-
 
 137 Foster Kamer, The Truth About Wall Street Bonuses in 2010: A Survey, ESQUIRE POLITICS 
BLOG (Dec. 21, 2010, 9:30 AM), http://www.esquire.com/blogs/politics/wall-street-bonuses-
2010. 
 138 SCHROEDER, FOUR DISCOURSES, supra note 50. 
 139 SCHROEDER, VENUS, supra note 11, at 13, 43. 
 140 Id. at 48–50. 
 141 FINK, supra note 5, at 119. The formula for the fundamental fantasy (∃ ◊ a) is read “the 
split subject has a relationship with the object cause of desire.” That is, the obsessive fantasizes 
that he actually has or could capture his beloved object. 
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sciously thinking. Should he lapse into fantasy or musing, or stop 
thinking altogether . . . he loses any conviction of being. His attempt 
to come into being or continue to be involves the conscious, thinking 
subject—the ego—not the divided subject who is unaware of certain 
of his own thoughts and desires. He believes himself to be the master 
of his own fate.142 
Consequently, he doesn’t just tend to be nonreflective, he refuses 
to reflect. In the words of Newsweek business columnist Daniel Gross, 
“[i]nvestment bankers are among the least reflective of financial birds. 
They deal with the problem at hand without asking too many questions 
about how it got there.”143 Terrified that he will cease to exist if he 
ceases to think and act, the obsessive person engages in frenzied behav-
ior. This is reflected in the workaholism that is the hallmark of the trad-
er profession, where work weeks of 80 or 100 hours are not unusual. 
Indeed, “hours” themselves function as an objet petit a to be endlessly 
amassed. 
The obsessive refuses to acknowledge “the unconscious—that for-
eign discourse within us, that discourse we do not and cannot con-
trol.”144 This lack of self-awareness may explain the extraordinary tone-
deafness of the investment banks that announced plans to pay record 
bonuses within a year of the federal bailout, as epitomized by Goldman 
Sachs chairman Lloyd Blankfein’s “witticism” that traders are “doing 
God’s work.”145 Of course, in this case, in the light of public opprobri-
um, Blankfein blinked. After persistent rumors that he would receive a 
bonus of up to $100,000,000 for 2009, he “only” received a bonus of 
about $9,000,000, payable in stock.146 Of course, only in a world in 
which number like $100,000,000 can be spoken without a red face, can 
the word “only” with respect to $9,000,000 be spoken with a straight 
face. 
In Fink’s words, “[t]he obsessive . . . views himself as a whole sub-
ject . . . not as someone who is unsure of what he is saying or what he 
wants—in other words, not as someone subject to lack. He fiercely re-
fuses to see himself as dependent on the Other.”147 As such, “[t]he per-
fect obsessive is the Ayn Randian ‘self-made man’ who believes he 
doesn’t owe anyone anything and that he made his fame and fortune in a 
 
 142 Id. at 122. 
 143 Daniel Gross, Inside Job: What Henry Paulson’s New Memoir Misses About His Own 
Responsibility for the Global Meltdown, SLATE MONEYBOX (Feb. 8, 2012, 10:05 AM), http://
www.slate.com/id/2244026. 
 144 FINK, supra note 5, at 122. 
 145 Lloyd Blankfein made this notorious statement in an interview with the Sunday Times of 
London. John Arlidge, I’m Doing ‘God’s Work’: Meet Mr. Goldman Sachs, SUNDAY TIMES 
(London), Nov. 8, 2009, at 1. 
 146 Blankfein Gets Bonus of $9 Million in Stock, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK BLOG (Feb. 5, 2010, 
5:19 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/02/05/blankfein-gets-bonus-of-9-million-in-stock/. 
 147 FINK, supra note 5, at 122. 
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completely ahistorical context, independent of any particular economic 
system government, industry or persons.”148 
Because he cannot recognize the subjectivity of others, the obses-
sive is not merely self-interested, he is destructive of others. Even in his 
relationship with his lover, “[h]is partner is annulled and neutralized, 
and he does not have to consider himself dependent on her, or on her 
desire for him in any way.”149 Consequently, “the annulling of the Oth-
er . . . is omnipresent in obsession.”150 
Why is this so? Precisely because the very existence of the Other 
belies the obsessive’s claim to be independent. But his struggle with the 
Other reveals his dependence. The obsessive dynamic is that of Hegel’s 
famous “master-slave” dialectic. 
In his Phenomenology of Spirit,151 Hegel hypothesizes a primitive 
society—modeled on archaic Greece—prior to the development of 
modern subjectivity. In ancient societies, slaves were typically persons 
captured in battle. In Hegel’s primitive society warriors try to obtain 
recognition through the fight to the death.152 Each man claims to be a 
self-consciousness and seeks to have this claim confirmed by another.153 
However, each also mistakenly thinks that the other’s claim to self-
consciousness is an impediment to his claim. He sees self-consciousness 
as a zero-sum game of “winner take all.” Consequently, they battle until 
only one is left standing. 
This is self-defeating. If a warrior dies he cannot be recognized; if 
he kills his rival, there is no one to recognize him.154 Eventually one 
warrior recognizes this contradiction. Because he realizes that there can 
be no self-consciousness without life (both his and his rival’s) and with-
out recognition by another, he lays down his arms and submits.155 This 
warrior who lays down his weapon in order to be recognized by the 
other is hysteric—a neurosis that is ethically more advanced than obses-
sion. Consequently, as I will discuss, the first stage in treating an obses-
sive is to hystericize him. Nevertheless, although more advanced, hyste-
ria is still a neurosis and an ethically dubious position. Indeed, Hegel 
shows how his capitulating warrior becomes a slave, debased and quak-
ing with fear before his idiotic master.156 
 
 148 Id. at 130. 
 149 Id. at 123–24. 
 150 Id. at 124. 
 151 G.W.F. HEGEL, HEGEL’S PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT (A.V. Miller trans., 5th ed. 1977) 
[hereinafter HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY]. 
 152 Id. at 112–13. 
 153 Id. at 113. 
 154 Id.  
 155 Id. at 115. 
 156 Although Hegel talks of the slave’s fear, the slave does not lay down his sword out of fear, 
as is often thought. Rather, he does so as an ethical act—he is not afraid to die, he is unwilling to 
kill. SCHROEDER, FOUR DISCOURSES, supra note 50, at 40. The slave only quakes with fear after 
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Another way to put this is that neurosis is created by a form of ne-
gation called “repression.” Repression is not, as popularly thought, 
merely another word for forgetting. One of the fundamental principles 
of psychoanalysis is that “repression and the return of the repressed are 
one and the same.”157 Although in repression the neurotic forces a 
thought or emotion out of his conscious, it is always there for all to see 
in his speech and behavior. This is what is meant by the unconscious. 
Lacan rejects the metaphor that the analyst is like Columbus discover-
ing a new continent, finding something that is unknown. Rather, he is 
like Jean François Champollion—the translator of the Rosetta Stone—
who helps reveal the meaning of that which is front and center.158 The 
obsessive represses his dependence on the Other. The return of this ob-
sessive’s repression of the Other is an obsession over denying the Other. 
A final way of describing this is that the masculine “logic” is one 
of “either-or”—as in either I am alive or he is. This is the obsessive’s 
question, “Am I dead or alive?”159 But the obsessive, like Hegel’s war-
rior, assumes this means that either I or you are alive so that for me to 
be alive, I must destroy you. 
As such, he tries to reproduce the imaginary realm of eat-or-be-
eaten. However, the obsessive is not a psychotic who is trapped in the 
mirror stage and forecloses (rather than represses) even the possibility 
of recognizing the big Other (i.e., intersubjective relations). The obses-
sive lives in the symbolic order of intersubjective relations. The trader’s 
life revolves around the intersubjective realm of the market, and he de-
pends on the bonus given to him by a firm—a collection of other sub-
jects. He tries to “destroy” the Other, not literally through murder, but 
symbolically by ignoring the contributions of other people and humiliat-
ing his rivals. 
This is to be contrasted with the feminine hysteric logic of “nei-
ther-nor.” At first blush, the hysteric’s question, “Am I a man or a 
woman?,” sounds like an either-or proposition (i.e., I am either a man or 
a woman). This is a misinterpretation. Lacan’s point is that the hysteric 
is always asking “Che voui?”—What do you want (i.e., from me)?160 
“How can I inflame your desire—do you want me to be a man or a 
woman?” Since she only exists as the object of the Other’s desire, either 
they both exist or neither does. 
 
he has disarmed himself. David Gray Carlson & Jeanne Schroeder, The Role of Fear in Hegel’s 
Master-Slave Dialectic, MONOKL (2009) (on file with author). 
 157 LACAN, SEMINAR III, supra note 99, at 86. In Lacan’s terms, they are two sides of the same 
coin. Id. at 12. 
 158 Interview with Jacques Lacan, PHIL. EXPLORATIONS HUM. MIND (Sept. 19, 2011), http://
braungardt.trialectics.com/sciences/psychoanalysis/jacques-lacan/interview-with-jacques-lacan/. 
 159 FINK, supra note 5, at 161. 
 160 See ŽIŽEK, ABYSS OF FREEDOM, supra note 100, at 81–82. 
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Perhaps this dynamic is illustrated in the relationship of Goldman 
Sachs and American International Group, Inc. (AIG). According to pub-
lished reports, AIG sold “insurance” to Goldman protecting the latter’s 
investment in certain real estate–related investments. As the real estate 
crisis intensified, Goldman squeezed AIG in two ways. First, it made 
claims concerning the losses on its guaranteed holdings and refused to 
allow AIG to present third-party valuations disputing these amounts. 
Second, as AIG’s credit ratings dropped (partially because of Gold-
man’s demands), Goldman insisted that AIG post more and more collat-
eral securing its guarantee obligations.161 Goldman, of course, can take 
the position that it merely engaged in smart business. From the perspec-
tive of a former transactional lawyer, it seems almost incomprehensible 
how AIG could have entered into contracts that did not provide for a 
procedure for the valuation of losses, but, given that it did, why should 
not Goldman exploit this? Nevertheless, from the position of an outsid-
er, it is striking that Goldman would persevere in its position to the ex-
tent of bringing AIG to the brink of bankruptcy. Of course, its wager 
paid off when the Federal Reserve intervened with Troubled Asset Re-
lief Program funds to make Goldman and other counterparties whole. 
To put this in another way, Goldman “correctly” guessed that the Fed, 
unlike Goldman, would not act like an obsessive and seek to destroy the 
Other, but would act as a hysteric and seek to preserve the Other. 
The symbolic destruction of the Other through the denial of de-
pendence on others may also help explain the persistence of the bonus 
system both before and after the bailout. Traders insist that they deserve 
the bonuses they earn. They are entitled to eat what they killed. They 
refuse to consider that the extent to which their success is part of the 
collective activity of the entire enterprise and that profits are supposed 
to belong to the shareholders, not management of a corporation. Firms 
such as Goldman Sachs, which paid back bailout money, seem oblivi-
ous to a public opinion that cannot be merely reduced to envious popu-
lism. Once again, they think they deserve the fruits of their own efforts, 
suppressing the fact that profits are to a large part dependent on the con-
tributions of other factors such as low-interest loans from the Fed, made 
possible by conversion to bank holding company status.162 
 
 161 Gretchen Morgenson & Louise Story, Testy Conflict with Goldman Helped Push A.I.G. to 
Precipice, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2010, at A1. 
 162 See, e.g., Glenn Greenwald, The Events Preceding Goldman Sachs’ New “Blowout Prof-
its,” SALON (July 13, 2009, 6:14 AM), http://www.salon.com/2009/07/13/goldman/. 
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E.     Bonus as Object 
 
The obsessive accumulates an object in an attempt to possess the 
ever-elusive object cause of his desire. The irony of this position is that, 
in fact, the obsessive who wants to ignore the Big Other does everything 
for the sake of the Big Other. The obsessive who wants to ignore the 
Other, who is always there, needs to destroy the Other, which means, in 
turn, that he obsesses about the Other at all times. As a result, in a vain 
attempt to convince himself of his wholeness, he tries first to convince 
others of it so they will reassure him with envy or, better yet, their hu-
miliation. This is the faulty logic of the foolish naked emperor who 
hoped that the cheers of the crowd would prove the existence of the 
beautiful new clothes that he himself could not see. It is 
the Other who passes on the law and whose jouissance is ensured by 
the obsessive’s accumulation of publications, titles, money, property, 
awards, and so on. This is but one illustration of how the neurotic, 
while positioning him- or herself in such a way as to avoid being the 
cause of the Other’s jouissance, unwittingly sacrifices jouissance to 
the Other nevertheless.163 
Let us once again return to the concept of an “object” and why the 
so-called “bonus” can serve as such. The Lacanian object is completely 
abstract. Fink suggests that the terminology is misleading—a remnant 
from an earlier stage of Lacanian thought. Rather, I argue, it results 
from the increasingly philosophical turn in Lacan’s thought over time. 
The late Lacan’s definition of “object” reflects that of Kant and Hegel—
not a physical “thing” but anything that can be distinguished from the 
subject himself.164 Or, perhaps more importantly, in the case of the ob-
sessive, what he believes can be distinguished from the Other. 
To recap, early Freudian theory was literal and prospective. It held 
that if the infant initially did not experience himself as separate from the 
external world that provided the satisfaction with his needs, his initial 
experience of individuation required the recognition of a specific exter-
nal physical object—e.g. the maternal breast.165 Personality, therefore, 
comes from object relations with actual physical objects that are substi-
tutes for the breast, the phallus, etc. 
Lacanian theory, by contrast, is an account abducted retroactively 
from the perspective of an adult looking back on an infancy he or she 
 
 163 FINK, supra note 5, at 129. 
 164 HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 58, at 38. 
 165 Sometimes even Fink describes this dynamic prospectively in terms of the child’s relation-
ship with the breast. See, e.g., FINK, supra note 5, at 119. 
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cannot literally remember. The lost “object,” therefore, is the trace of 
the imagined (in the technical sense of the term) lost unity with the 
mOther. The obsessive imagines that he could once again achieve 
wholeness if he could (re)acquire this trace. 
Accordingly, the “object” that the obsessive seeks is not necessari-
ly, or even characteristically, a physical “thing.” It is just that which the 
subject thinks is external to himself that is missing. The more abstract 
the “object,” the better it serves this purpose. 
I suggested that “money” in the form of the annual “bonus” serves 
this purpose. It has at least two advantages. First, the bonus is always 
missing. An objet petit a must, by definition, be a missing thing because 
if one had the thing, one would no longer desire it.166 If one actually 
acquired one’s “object,” one would be confronted with the fact that the 
object does not satisfy. Consequently, one would have to immediately 
identify another “object” to fulfill this role. Conveniently, the bonus is 
an object that one never completely acquires. No matter how many bo-
nuses one receives and no matter how large they are, one never com-
pletely acquires the bonus. There is always next year’s bonus. 
As I have said, the very word “bonus” implies something extra, 
something more than what exists.167 The obsessive concern with the 
“bonus” as opposed to the amount of compensation paid briefly became 
a cause of amusement in the New York City press during the 2010 bo-
nus season. Apparently, in response to public concern over the bonus 
system, investment banks chose to raise the base salaries of certain em-
ployees in lieu of including them in the year-end bonus pools. Reported-
ly, despite the fact that the economic position of these “Zeroes” re-
mained the same, they were viewed with contempt by their colleagues 
(and by themselves) and wandered zombielike through the halls of 
banks.168 
 
 166 As Žižek notes: 
For Lacan, human desire (in contrast to animal instinct) is always, constitutively, me-
diated by reference to Nothingness: the true object-cause of desire (as opposed to the 
objects that satisfy our needs) is, by definition, a “metonymy of lack,” a stand-in for 
Nothingness. (Which is why, for Lacan, objet petit a as the object-cause of desire is the 
originally lost object: it is not only that we desire it in so far as it is lost—this object is 
nothing but a loss positivized.) 
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK, THE TICKLISH SUBJECT: THE ABSENT CENTER OF POLITICAL ONTOLOGY 107 
(1999) [hereinafter ŽIŽEK, THE TICKLISH SUBJECT] (footnote omitted). In other words, “the 
‘cause of desire’ must be in itself a metonymy of lack—that is to say, an object which is not 
simply lacking but, in its very positivity, gives body to a lack. . . . a ‘something that stands for 
nothing’.” SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK, THE PLAGUE OF FANTASIES 81 (1997) [hereinafter ŽIŽEK, PLAGUE]. 
 167 See supra text at note 131. 
 168 According to The New York Times, “[e]ven though employees will receive roughly the 
same amount of money, the psychological blow of not getting a bonus is substantial, especially in 
a Wall Street culture that has long equated success and prestige with bonus size.” This Bonus 
Season on Wall Street, Many See Zeros, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK BLOG (Dec. 20, 2010, 2:03 
AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/12/20/this-bonus-season-on-wall-street-many-see-zeros. 
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The reason why the obsessive obsessively tries to accumulate his 
objet petit a is precisely because, although the object acts as though it 
were the cause of his desire, in fact his desire precedes its “cause.”169 
The subject’s true desire is to be both whole (to be one with the mater-
nal) and to be a subject (to be an individual recognized by the paternal), 
but this is not possible. He is only a subject insofar as he is recognized 
as such by others. This means that the obsessive’s true desire is the 
same as the hysteric’s—the desire of the Other. Consequently, when the 
subject acquires the object that he imagines causes his desire, his desire 
continues and increases. The obsessive, who will not admit his empti-
ness, tries and tries again to convince himself and others that he is 
whole. He wants to convince himself that he does not need others, by 
outdoing others. 
We saw this dynamic in the Trader Monthly article discussed 
above.170 The obsessive trader wants a $300,000 turntable, not because 
he needs a turntable, but because he wants to give the other traders a big 
middle finger, as though this phallic display could prove that he has the 
phallus. This is not, however, the pop-culture point that men want to 
prove that “his” is bigger than his rivals. Rather, the turntable is a 
weapon, with which the obsessive can bludgeon his rival. 
In the words of Alenka Zupančič: 
the objet petit a designates nothing but the absence, the lack of the 
object, the void around which desire turns. After a need is satisfied, 
and the subject gets the demanded object, desire continues on its 
own; it is not “extinguished” by the satisfaction of need. The mo-
ment the subject attains the object she demands, the objet petit a ap-
pears, as a marker of that which the subject still “has not got,” or 
does not have—and this itself constitutes the “echte” object of de-
sire.171 
Second, the obsessive’s pursuit of his object is an attempt to oblite-
rate others. In contrast with what neoclassic economics preaches, the 
obsessive does not seek money for the sake of consumption. To the 
obsessive, the point is the accumulation of points. 
The obsessive tries to maximize wealth, rather than utility. Para-
doxically, the obsessive who asserts his independence from the Other 
always ends up living for the Other. In Lacan’s words: “‘Everything for 
the other’ says the obsessive, and that is what he does, for being in the 
 
 169 As Žižek says, “[t]he paradox of desire is that it posits retrospectively its own cause, i.e., 
the object a is the object that can be perceived only by a gaze ‘distorted’ by desire, an object that 
does not exist from an ‘objective’ gaze.” ŽIŽEK, LOOKING AWRY, supra note 100, at 12. 
 170 See supra text at notes 22–23. 
 171 ALENKA ZUPANČIČ, ETHICS OF THE REAL: KANT, LACAN 18 (2000). 
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perpetual whirlwind . . . of destroying the other, he can never do enough 
to ensure that the other continues to exist.”172 
He only exists through his endless competition with the Other. 
Fink asserts that 
[i]n a sense the obsessive . . . lives for “Posterity” and not for today 
[he] transfers all jouissance to the Other . . . .The obsessive lives 
posthumously, sacrificing everything (all satisfaction in the here and 
now) for the sake of his name—having his name live on. The 
name . . . is in some sense the Other who passes on the law and 
whose jouissance is ensured by the obsessive’s accumulation of pub-
lications, titles, money, property, awards, and so on.173 
The reason why he keeps asking himself whether he is alive or 
dead is because he unconsciously understands that he lives his life as 
though he were always already dead. 
In other words, the obsessive ceaselessly acts out a spectacle for 
others because he only knows himself as alive through the Other’s ap-
plause. His objects serve as props that he desperately juggles to get his 
audience’s attention. 
An obsessive is unwilling or unable to admit to his problem be-
cause to do so would betray his fantasy that he is whole and that he does 
not need others. Unlike the hysteric, the obsessive does not seek treat-
ment. The obsessive only sees his problem when he is forced to con-
front the dependence on the Other that he desires.174 A typical example 
is when an obsessive loses his job, or his business fails.175 Of course, the 
problem with the trader culture only was recognized when the real es-
tate bubble burst. This event, which awakens him to the demands of the 
Other, “hystericizes” him.176 
When the obsessive has a break, he feels like a fake, a pretender—
which is precisely what he is. Ultimately, like Shakespeare’s great ob-
sessive, Macbeth, he realizes that the reason he “struts and frets his hour 
on the stage” is because he “signifies nothing.”177 He has lived his life 
posthumously, he is always already dead. In Wall Street parlance, he is 
a “Zero.” 
Nevertheless, the obsessive, who believes that he should be a mas-
ter of the universe, rarely initiates analysis on his own. That would be to 
admit publicly that he is a fake, a split subject who needs others. It 
would require the type of self-criticism that he desperately tries to 
 
 172 Quoted in FINK, supra note 5, at 118. 
 173 Id. at 129. 
 174 Id. at 131 (“The obsessive is shaken up by such manifestations of the Other’s desire, and 
can no longer successfully nullify or neutralize the Other and his dependence on the Other.”). 
 175 Which is the example that Fink gives in the case analysis he presents of an archetypical 
obsessive. Id. at 135. 
 176 Id. at 131. 
 177 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH act 5, sc. 5. 
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avoid. Rather, he tends to go because someone in his life insists that he 
try it. In this case, the only person who could do this is the state, in the 
form of the Fed, the SEC, or whatever. 
Even within analysis, the obsessive resists analysis.178 He does not 
want to change and give up his insistence on being whole. He does not 
want to become cured of his obsession, he wants the pretense of obses-
sion to be reinstated. Consequently, his “hysterization is fragile and 
short-lived; the obsessive often reverts quite quickly to shutting out the 
Other and denying any kind of dependence.”179 The obsessive tries to 
take over his analysis. He becomes the expert, “to talk on and on, to 
associate and interpret all by himself, paying no heed to the analyst’s 
punctuations or interpretations.”180 There is no real attempt to confront 
his internal reality, merely to formulate a canned response. 
This, of course, raises the problem of “too big to fail.” The paradox 
of a bailout is that although on the one hand it demonstrates to others 
how every firm and trader in the financial industry is dependent on oth-
ers—both other firms and the government—by allowing firms to con-
tinue in business, it allows them to maintain the fantasy that they are 
separate from others. Bonuses have been reinstated because bankers 
once again believe that they deserve to eat what they kill. During the 
crisis, venerable investment banks such as Goldman reorganized as 
bank holding companies. Now, as soon as the immediate crisis seems to 
be over, the industry is fighting any meaningful regulatory reform that 
might forestall the next crisis.181 
Successful analysis of an obsessive analysand requires that his hys-
tericization be prolonged, that his subjectivity be restructured from an 
position that sees only the object of desire, and does not merely ignore, 
but actively tries to destroy the Other, to a position that actively seeks to 
understand the Other’s desire. 
In 2009 and 2010 “traders” attempted to address public outrage 
over the bonus culture by paying a large percentage of bonuses in the 
form of stock as opposed to cash.182 The hope was that this might better 
 
 178 FINK, supra note 5, at 130. Even when he “realizes he has problems [he] engages only in 
‘self-analysis,’ keeping a journal, writing down his dreams, and so on.” Id. 
 179 Id. at 131. 
 180 Id. 
 181 As widely reported in the press, the investment banking industry, which donated generous-
ly to the Obama campaign and the Democratic party during the height of the crisis in 2008, expe-
rienced “buyer’s remorse” and contributed to the Republicans in the 2010 congressional elections. 
See, e.g., David D. Kirkpatrick, Irked, Wall St. Hedges Its Bet on Democrats, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 
2010, at A1. 
 182 See, e.g., Graham Bowley, Wall Street '09 Bonuses Increase 17% to $20 Billion, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb 24. 2010, at B8; Graham Bowley & Eric Dash, Goldman Chief's $9 Million Bonus 
Seen by Some as Show of Restraint, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2010, at B1; Eric Dash, Top Pay List for 
Bankers: Fresh Names, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2010, at A1; Nancy Cook, The Bonus Babies are 
Back, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 21, 2010, 7:00 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/id/231892. 
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align the traders’ incentives with the interests of shareholders, the in-
vestment public, the government, or the citizenry in general. This may 
or may not be true. In my analysis, this change in the material form of 
the “object” is irrelevant to the dynamics of obsession. 
The psychoanalytical approach is slightly, but crucially different. 
The issue is whether changes in the bonus practices can restructure the 
trader culture to make it more hysteric in the sense of making traders 
admit to themselves and accept their dependence on others. 
Some changes in 2010 bonuses—such as paying bonuses in re-
stricted stock—was a step in this direction. But incentives are about 
better aligning the interests of traders with the longer-term interests of 
the stockholders of their employers. However, so long as most compen-
sation is based on providing traders with the individual bonus that is the 
obscure object of their desire, rather than on obligations to the Other—
whether in the forms of the firm or society—firms encourage obses-
sional behavior. 
 
V.     MORALITY V. EVIL 
A.     Radical Evil 
 
The archetypical trader is an obsessive who identifies his bonus as 
his objet petit a and experiences money as the cause of his behavior, 
which, at the extremes, is not only self-destructive but destructive of 
others. But, is money then the root of all evil? 
At the beginning of this Article, I referred to the fact that the com-
mon adage mistranslates St. Paul’s condemnation of the love of money 
in such a way as to shift attention away from the subject of sin to its 
object.183 It is this attempt to exonerate the sinner from responsibility 
that is pernicious. This is precisely the obsessive move that makes the 
objet petit a the cause of a preexisting desire. Immanuel Kant would say 
that this move is radically evil. In his seventh seminar entitled The Eth-
ics of Psychoanalysis,184 Lacan implicitly suggested that he would 
agree. 
Kant identified three forms of radical evil.185 By radical, he did not 
mean an extraordinary or demonic evil,186 or another form of particular-
ly heinous sin. Rather, he was referring to the often banal evil that lies 
 
 183 See supra text at note 1. 
 184 See supra note 26. 
 185 IMMANUEL KANT, RELIGION WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF MERE REASON 117 (Allen 
Wood ed., George Di Giovanni trans., 1998) [hereinafter KANT, RELIGION]. 
 186 The association of the term “radical evil” with demonic evil probably comes from Hannah 
Arendt’s attempt to distinguish banal evil. HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A 
REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL (1963). 
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at the root (radix) of human nature and keeps any of our actions from 
being purely moral.187 It is the philosophic analog to the theological 
concept of Original Sin—a fundamental corruption that underlies our 
best efforts to be holy. 
To oversimplify, Kant thought that morality required that one act 
purely out of duty to the moral law.188 To do this, one must act as an 
autonomous, rational person, free from external pressures, or “patholo-
gy.”189 This is a broad term that includes all empirical considerations 
including our emotions. (Kant goes so far as to say that if one feeds a 
starving child out of compassion the act might be good, but it would not 
be moral because it is not done purely out of duty.190) Because no man 
can fathom the depths of his own soul,191 no one can ever be completely 
sure of his own motive and know whether he is acting out of morality or 
pathology. This is why Lacan thought that Kant, and not Freud, was the 
father of psychoanalysis.192 
The three forms of radical evil are lies we tell ourselves in order to 
try to justify deviations from morality and indulgence in pathology. The 
most serious form of radical evil is the hypocrisy of “wickedness.”193 
The wicked makes no honest attempt to discover the moral law but tells 
himself that the moral law just happens to coincide with his desires. 
This allows him to indulge in his pathology while insisting all along that 
it pains him to do so—he is only following his duty. 
The second and less serious radical evil is “impurity.”194 The im-
pure subject recognizes his duty to the moral law and understands that 
its dictates are distinct from his pathological inclinations. Nevertheless, 
he seeks a strategy so that he can have his cake and eat it too—indulge 
his pathology while purportedly obeying the moral law. He does this by 
disingenuously interpreting the law narrowly in order to find loopholes 
 
 187 KANT, RELIGION, supra note 185, at 59 (“This evil is radical, since it corrupts the ground 
of all maxims; as natural propensity, it is also not to be extirpated through human forces.”). 
 188 IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON 38, 93, 102 (T.K. Abbott trans., 
1996) [hereinafter KANT, PRACTICAL REASON]; Jeanne L. Schroeder & David Gray Carlson, 
Kenneth Starr: Diabolically Evil?, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 653, 671–72 (2000) (reviewing multiple 
works of Slavoj Žižek). 
 189 Kant’s term “pathology” does not have the conventional connotation of diseased. Rather, it 
refers to our emotions, desires, instincts, and any other empirical motivation we might have for 
action other than duty to the moral law. SCHROEDER, FOUR DISCOURSES, supra note 50, at 80–
83; ZUPANČIČ, supra note 171, at 7. 
 190 HENRY E. ALLISON, KANT’S THEORY OF FREEDOM 186 (1990); Schroeder & Carlson, 
supra note 188, at 671. 
 191 IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 196 (Mary Gregor ed. & trans., 1996) 
(“The depths of the human heart are unfathomable.”). 
 192 Indeed, according to Žižek, Lacan identifies the Critique of Practical Reason as the “birth 
of psychoanalysis.” ŽIŽEK, FOR THEY KNOW NOT WHAT THEY DO, supra note 112, at 229. 
 193 KANT, RELIGION, supra note 185, at 54; Schroeder & Carlson, supra note 188, at 653, 
675–77. 
 194 KANT, RELIGION, supra note 185, at 53–54. I have called this elsewhere “legalism.” 
Schroeder & Carlson, supra note 188, at 675–76. 
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that would permit him to follow his pathological inclinations. That is, he 
tells himself that he is obeying the law when he is really just trying to 
skirt the law. He tries to avoid the spirit of the law by parsing its letter. 
The final, most venal, and perhaps most common radical evil is 
“frailty,” or weakness of the will.195 The frail subject may know in his 
heart that he does wrong, but claims that he couldn’t help himself. The 
spirit is willing but the flesh is weak. The devil made me do it. Money, 
rather than my love of money, is the root of my evil. Kant believes that 
regardless of the degree of temptation or coercion, one always chooses 
one’s actions and bears moral responsibility for one’s failures. Conse-
quently, he insisted that “you can because you must.”196 Frailty is the 
characteristic radical evil of neuroses, generally, and obsession, specifi-
cally. 
To understand this, let us return yet again to the psychoanalytic ac-
count of individuation. 
 
B.     Forced Choice 
 
Lacanian ethics is heavily influenced by Kantian ethics. The vul-
garized notion of psychology is victimology—I am the product of my 
upbringing and, therefore, somehow not fully culpable for my behavior. 
Lacanianism rejects this as psychobabble. 
As we have seen, subjectivity is created by submitting to the pater-
nal law—the “incest taboo.”197 As Freud makes clear, this primal law is 
not a command, but a social contract.198 We do not merely obey the law, 
we agree to it. Freud seems to have understood this in terms of a utilitar-
ian-type bargain.199 The child agrees to the social contract because he 
believes that by doing so he will achieve greater happiness. The loss of 
direct access to the mother and the repression of one’s polymorphously 
perverse infantile desires is initially painful, but the child is compen-
sated by the pleasures of maturity and the more satisfying relationships 
of marriage and parenthood. 
Lacan rejects such romantic notions.200 The child experiences the 
achievement of subjectivity as painful—this is one reason it is called 
 
 195 KANT, RELIGION, supra note 185, at 53. 
 196 See SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK, THE METASTASIS OF ENJOYMENT: SIX ESSAYS ON WOMAN AND CAU-
SALITY 99–100 (1994). 
 197 See supra text at notes 105–112. 
 198 FREUD, M & M, supra note 107, at 103–04. 
 199 See supra text at note 111–112. 
 200 In Žižek’s words: 
Lacan rejects all usual attempts to . . . present it as a “reasonable” decision which pro-
vides a greater amount of long-term pleasure . . . contrary to Lacan for whom the pro-
hibition of incest is unconditional, since it is radically unaccountable. In it, I give 
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castration. Freud seems to assume that subjectivity has some affirmative 
content that will make up for the loss of the fantasy of unity with the 
mother. For Lacan, subjectivity and freedom are abstract and negative. 
To become individuated and recognizable as a subject is to become 
alienated, lonely, and tormented by desire. Consequently, the bargain 
that society offers the child is questionable at best. It has its consola-
tions—individuation allows us to love, desire allows us to create, the cut 
of castration leaves us unbounded and free. Nevertheless, Mick Jagger 
is right: we “can’t get no satisfaction.”201 
Nevertheless, Lacan agrees with Freud that subjectivity is a legal 
status created by contract. The child cannot become an adult subject 
unless he accepts an offer made in the father’s name. If the bargain is so 
questionable, why do most of us accept it? 
Because it is a forced choice.202 The paternal bargain is the Godfa-
ther’s offer you can’t refuse.203 Lacan uses the analogy of the hold-up 
man’s offer of your money or your life.204 The child experiences his 
parents as so overwhelmingly powerful that he tells himself that cannot 
hold up against their bargaining power. 
The existence of psychotics, however, reveals that we are lying to 
ourselves—we could have refused the paternal offer. A psychotic is a 
person who never exits the mirror stage. He does not merely refuse to 
accept the paternal offer. He “forecloses” (refuses to even acknowledge) 
the very possibility of the paternal function and the symbolic order so 
that he might retain his dualistic, imaginary relationship with the mater-
nal.205 The rest of us who gave in to the paternal bargain because we 
claim we had no choice, reveal the radical evil of frailty. The psychotic, 
by contrast, never swerves from what he believes is right. As such, from 
a Kantian perspective psychosis is created by a purely moral act. 
However, just as the brave soul who, in Lacan’s example, refuses 
the gunman’s bargain loses both his money and his life, the psychotic 
pays dearly for his moral stance with insanity. In other words, if the 
reward the symbolic order offers the child for accepting its bargain is 
inadequate to compensate for his sacrifice, the consequences to the in-
fant of not accepting it are dire. 
 
something in exchange for nothing—or (and therein consists its fundamental paradox) 
in so far as the incestuous object is in itself impossible, I give nothing in exchange for 
something (the “permitted” non-incestuous object). 
ŽIŽEK, FOR THEY KNOW NOT WHAT THEY DO, supra note 112, at 230–31. 
 201 Mick Jagger & Keith Richards, (I Can’t Get No) Satisfaction, on OUT OF OUR HEADS 
(London Records 1965). 
 202 In Miller’s words, “Lacan defines alienation as a ‘forced choice.’’” Miller, supra note 113; 
see also ŽIŽEK, THE TICKLISH SUBJECT, supra note 166, at 18–19, 90–98, 298–99. 
 203 THE GODFATHER (Paramount Pictures 1972). 
 204 LACAN, SEMINAR XI, supra note 99, at 212. 
 205 FINK, supra note 5, at 79–82. 
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The classic M’Naghten test sees insanity as the inability to know 
the difference between right and wrong.206 To a Lacanian, this gets the 
test backwards. Although the normal neurotic knows that there is a dif-
ference between right and wrong, he is never completely sure which is 
which. He keeps asking the Big Other what it wants of him, but it never 
answers.207 Morality is born from uncertainty in the sense that it is the 
precondition of free will. In Kant’s tragic metaphor, if we could actually 
see the mind of God and know what our duty was, we would not be-
come moral. Rather, we would be mere automatons.208 Our actions 
would have no moral purchase because there would be no choice. 
This is the position of the psychotic. The psychotic always 
“knows.”209 Indeed, God frequently speaks directly to him.210 Paradoxi-
cally, therefore, although the psychotic’s rejection of the paternal bar-
gain is itself an ethical act, it leaves him incapable of acting ethically in 
the future. 
The goal of psychoanalysis is personal responsibility.211 Conse-
quently, although the neurotic’s choices may have been “forced” upon 
him by his parents, they are nevertheless always choices. The subject, 
therefore, bears and deserves to bear ethical responsibility for these 
choices. Indeed, perhaps this is why Freud, despite his tendency toward 
determinism, stated that one must take responsibility even “for the evil 
impulses of one’s dreams. What else is one to do with them?”212 
 
C.     Obsession and Hystericization 
 
If the process of individuation, generally, reflects the radical evil of 
frailty, then the obsessional response is a specific example. The obses-
sive refuses to take responsibility for his subjectivity. He refuses to face 
the fact that he is nothing but the desire that is the desire of the Other. 
Rather, he insists that he desires because of the object that he chooses to 
act as the object cause of his desire. By deflecting his desire from his 
soul to an imagined cause, he makes money not the root of all evil, but 
makes it act like the cause of a very specific evil. 
 
 206 M’Naghten’s Case, (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L.). 
 207 SCHROEDER, FOUR DISCOURSES, supra note 50, at 166. In Lacan’s words, “[c]ertainty is 
the rarest thing for the normal subject.” LACAN, SEMINAR III, supra note 99, at 87. 
 208 KANT, PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 188, at 123. 
 209 FINK, supra note 5, at 84–85. 
 210 Id. at 84. 
 211 Perhaps this is why Lacanians believe that although they can be treated, psychotics cannot 
be cured. Id. at 82. 
 212 SIGMUND FREUD, SOME ADDITIONAL NOTES UPON DREAM-INTERPRETATION AS A 
WHOLE (1925), quoted in Ernst Lewy, Responsibility, Free Will, and Ego Psychology, 17 INT’L J. 
PSYCHOANALYSIS 260 (1961). 
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By doing so, the obsessive avoids confronting himself and others. 
He can tell himself that he is homo economicus—the rational individual 
who logically follows incentives and chooses the best means to achieve 
his pregiven ends. His morality is reduced to utilitarianism. 
Consequently, the behavior that led to the market meltdown may 
be completely understandable within classic economic analysis and 
Lacanian psychoanalysis, without any reference to behavioral theory. 
The trader culture has chosen money in the form of “bonuses” as its 
objet petit a. The trader’s life, which means the business of trading, 
revolves around finding the best means of achieving the bonus per se 
rather than engaging in any productive activity. The obsessive concen-
trates on his objet petit a as a way of avoiding his dependence on, and 
responsibility to, others. It is hardly surprising, then, that the trader en-
ters into deals that generate bonuses regardless of the risk imposed on 
his firm and the possible losses to its shareholders. 
This is absolutely economically rational given the trader’s choice 
of maximand. But, is this ethical? 
In The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, Lacan suggests that the only ethi-
cal rule that psychoanalysis can offer is: do not give way with respect to 
your desire.213 At first blush, this might seem like the antithesis of eth-
ics: indulge in your pathology or solipsism. Specifically, it might seem 
to be an endorsement of obsession: chase after your objet petit a. On 
further reflection, it means quite the opposite. The injunction not to give 
way with respect to one’s desire, does not mean to give in to one’s pa-
thologies. 
The true desire is not the objet petit a. The only way the obsessive 
can be true to his true desire is to give up his obsession with the objet 
petit a, and turn his attention to the Other that the obsessive has in the 
past tried to deny and destroy. Consequently, just as Lacan insisted that 
the first stage of psychoanalyzing an obsessive consists of hystericizing 
the analysand,214 hystericization is also the first moral step for an obses-
sive. Consequently, I have argued extensively that legal ethics requires 
that the attorney who represents clients must take on the feminine posi-
tion of hysteria.215 
In the business world, hystericization would mean recognizing 
one’s dependence on, and responsibility for, others, at least within one’s 
own firm. This sense of acting as though one did not have a self is pre-
 
 213 LACAN, SEMINAR VII, supra note 26, at 319. 
 214 FINK, supra note 5, at 130–31. 
 215 SCHROEDER, FOUR DISCOURSES, supra note 50, at 154–60; Jeanne L. Schroeder, The Four 
Discourses of Law: A Lacanian Analysis of Legal Practice and Scholarship, 79 TEX. L. REV. 15 
(2000). 
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cisely Benjamin Cardozo’s definition of fiduciary duty in the seminal 
case of Meinhard v. Salmon.216 
 
 216 249 N.Y. 458 (1928). 
